Reasonable responses versus proportionality in employee dismissal cases: A comparison between the Employment Rights Act 1996, s 98(4) and the Equality Act 2010, s 13(2), s 15(1)(b), and s 19(2)(d). by O’Brien, Susan B
 1 
 
Reasonable responses versus proportionality in 
employee dismissal cases: 
A comparison between the Employment Rights Act 1996, s 98(4) and the 
Equality Act 2010, s 13(2), s 15(1)(b), and s 19(2)(d). 
 
 
 
 
Susan B O’Brien 
 
 
 
A project submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of 
Northumbria University for the Degree of LLM Employment Law in 
Practice 
 
Research undertaken in the School of Law 
 
2018YL_LW7060BND31 
 
 May 2019 
 
 Word count: 17,288 
 2 
Declaration 
 
I declare that the work contained in this project is my own and that it has not been submitted for 
assessment in another programme at this or any other institution at postgraduate or undergraduate 
level. I also confirm that this work fully acknowledges the opinions, ideas and contributions from 
the work of others.  
 
I confirm that the research undertaken for the completion of this project was based entirely on 
secondary material or data already in the public domain (case law, journal articles, published surveys 
etc.). It did not involve people in data collection through empirical research (e.g. interviews, 
questionnaires or as a result of observation). The ethical risk is low. 
 
Signed: Susan B O’Brien 
Dated: 10th May 2019 
  
 3 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Declaration…………………………………………….………………………………………………………………………………………2 
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………6 
Chapter 1: An overview of unfair dismissal and discrimination law…………………………………………………7 
- 1.0 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….7 
- 1.1 Background to legislation………………………………………………………………………………………………7 
- 1.2 Purposes behind statutory regulation of dismissal………………………………………………………..8 
- 1.3 Defining dismissal………………………………………………………………………………………………………….9 
- 1.4 Entitlement to claim……………………………………………………………………………………………………10 
- 1.5 Stages of an unfair dismissal claim………………………………………………………………………………10 
o 1.5.1 Potentially fair reasons for dismissal…………………………………………………………….11 
o 1.5.2 The significance of section 98(4)…………………….…………………………………………….13 
- 1.6 Stages of a discrimination claim………………………………………………………………………………….13 
o 1.6.1 Indirect discrimination………………………………………………………………………………....14 
o 1.6.2 Discrimination arising from disability……………………………………………………………14 
o 1.6.3 Direct age discrimination………………………………………………………………………………15 
o 1.6.4 Significance of a justification defence…………………………………………………………..15 
- 1.7 Chapter conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………..16 
Chapter 2: Unfair dismissal and the test of reasonableness………………………………………………………….17 
- 2.0 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..17 
- 2.1 Established interpretations of section 98(4)……………………………………………………………….17 
- 2.2 Summarising the test…………………………………………………………………………………………………..20 
- 2.3 Application of the reasonable responses test………………………………………………………………22 
o 2.3.1 Conduct………………………………………………………………………………………………………..24 
o 2.3.2 Capability……………………………………………………………………………………………………..27 
o 2.3.3 Redundancy…………………………………………………………………………………………………28 
o 2.3.4 Contravention of statute……………………………………………………………………………..29 
o 2.3.5 SOSR…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….29 
 4 
- 2.4 Criticisms of the reasonable responses test…………………………………………………………………31 
o 2.4.1 Misinterpretation of the statutory wording………………………………………………….31 
o 2.4.2 Perversity……………………………………………………………………………………………………..32 
o 2.4.3 Power to employers……………………………………………………………………………………..35 
- 2.5 Potential developments in the reasonable responses test…………………………………………..38 
- 2.6 Chapter conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………..41 
Chapter 3: Objective justification within the EqA………………………………………………………………………….42 
- 3.0 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..42 
- 3.1 Justification defences………………………………………………………………………………………………….42 
- 3.2 The European background…………………………………………………………………………………………..43 
- 3.3 Legitimate aim…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….45 
- 3.4 Proportionate means…………………………………………………………………………………………………..47 
- 3.5 Level of appropriate scrutiny………………………………………………………………………………………53 
- 3.6 Application of proportionality to dismissal cases…………………………………………………………53 
o 3.6.1 Conduct………………………………………………………………………………………………………..55 
o 3.6.2 Capability……………………………………………………………………………………………………..57 
o 3.6.3 Redundancy………………………………………………………………………………………………….59 
o 3.6.4 Other reasons for dismissal…………………………………………………………………………..59 
- 3.7 Criticisms of the UK’s approach to proportionality………………………………………………………59 
- 3.8 Potential developments in proportionality………………………………………………………………….61 
- 3.9 Chapter conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………..61 
Chapter 4: Interactions between reasonable responses and proportionality………………………………..63 
- 4.0 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..63 
- 4.1 Comparisons between reasonable responses and proportionality………………………………63 
o 4.1.1 Intention and focus………………………………………………………………………………………64 
o 4.1.2 Alternative actions to dismissal…………………………………………………………………….64 
o 4.1.3 Level of judicial restraint………………………………………………………………………………65 
o 4.1.4 Procedural fairness……………………………………………………………………………………….65 
o 4.1.5 Substantive justice………………………………………………………………………………………..66 
o 4.1.6 Power balance between employer and employee………………………………………..66 
 5 
o 4.1.7 Objectivity…………………………………………………………………………………………………….66 
o 4.1.8 Future direction…………………………………………………………………………………………...67 
- 4.2 Interaction between both tests in dual claim situations………………………………………………67 
o 4.2.1 Sickness absence…………………………………………………………………………………….……67 
o 4.2.2 Conduct……………………………………………………………………………………………………….69 
- 4.3 Potential future directions for dual claims………………………………………………………………….70 
- 4.4 Chapter conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………..72 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………73 
- 5.0 Summary of findings……………………………………………………………………………………………………73 
- 5.1 Implications…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………74 
- 5.2 Final remarks………………………………………………………………………………………………………………75 
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….76 
- Books………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..76 
- Articles………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………76 
- Statute………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………77 
- Cases…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………78 
Glossary of abbreviations used……………………………………………………………………………………………………85
 6 
 
Introduction 
 
What, if any, are the differences between a dismissal that is reasonable and one that 
is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? That is the question at the 
centre of this dissertation. To answer it we start by placing both legal tests within the 
overall context of statute, then assess and analyse both separately. From that point 
the two can be fully compared. The structure of this dissertation is thus as follows: 
 
Chapter one outlines statutory provisions regulating dismissal from employment in 
both the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA) and Equality Act 2010 (EqA). It identifies 
the key role of section 98(4) of the ERA in deciding unfair dismissal claims; and the 
likewise key roles of sections 13(2), 15(1)(b), and 19(2)(d) of the EqA in deciding some 
categories of discrimination claim. 
 
Chapter two examines the application of ERA s 98(4) in depth to identify its 
interpretation, its impact on claimants and employers, and the likelihood of future 
legal developments in this area. Chapter three carries out a similar exercise for 
sections 13(2), 15(1)(b), and 19(2)(d) of the EqA. 
 
Having identified the central concepts of reasonable responses and proportionality, 
chapter four compares them directly. It focuses particularly on dual claim situations 
where both tests are necessarily applied side by side to the same facts. Overall 
conclusions are made about both differences and similarities found. It is argued that 
the relationship between reasonableness and proportionality in cases of employee 
dismissal is not fully settled within case law, and further clarification will likely be 
necessary in the future. Such clarification could go to the heart of distinctions between 
unfair dismissal and discrimination in UK law. 
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Chapter 1: 
An overview of unfair dismissal and 
discrimination law 
 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter summarises key aspects of legislation relating to dismissal from 
employment and identifies the particular legal tests to be explored later within the 
dissertation. 
 
1.1 Background to legislation 
Under common law, an individual has limited rights of redress if they are dismissed 
from employment.1 This is because under the law of contract, one party may give 
notice to another to terminate an agreement, subject to its specific terms.2 Therefore, 
even if an employee makes a wrongful dismissal claim based on breach of contract, 
the maximum amount of damages awarded will be the sum of wages and/or other 
benefits that they would have been entitled to during the contractual period of 
notice.3 
 
The Industrial Relations Act 1971 extended the law significantly with its introduction 
of a right not to be unfairly dismissed.4 The deceptively simple wording of that statute 
has continued in law under various forms since, most recently within the ERA.5  
 
By contrast, anti-discrimination legislation is designed for a broader range of claims in 
various settings.6 Dismissal from employment has always been included in this.7 As 
                                                 
1 H Collins, Justice in Dismissal: The Law of Termination of Employment (OUP 1992) 
31. 
2 D Brodie, The Contract of Employment (W Green & Son 2008) 225. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Collins (n 1) 23, 35. 
5 S Deakin & G Morris, Labour Law (6th edn, Hart Publishing 2012) 594. 
6 B Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (Hart Publishing 2011) 25. 
7 See for example the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, s 6(2)(b) and Race Relations Act 
1976, s 4(2)(c). 
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such, since the mid 1970s it has been theoretically possible for a dismissed employee 
to bring dual claims of both unfair dismissal and discrimination. Importantly, the drive 
towards the latter statutory regulation came from the European Union (EU) in the 
form of various Equal Treatment Directives. 8  This has given anti-discrimination 
legislation a distinctly European construction as compared to that of unfair dismissal.9 
 
The EqA was designed to consolidate, standardise and replace most previous anti-
discrimination legislation.10 It provides protection against discrimination for those in 
or seeking employment. 11  This again includes situations where an employee is 
dismissed. 12 
 
1.2 Purposes behind statutory regulation of dismissal 
Collins has conducted an analysis of the purpose behind unfair dismissal legislation.13 
His conclusion is that statutory regulation of an employer’s decision to dismiss is 
connected to a desire for autonomy and human dignity in the workplace.14 Losing a 
job has not only an economic impact – which can be remedied by a flexible labour 
market – but also has a psychological and emotional impact on the individual.15 This, 
Collins argues, is why unfair dismissal legislation regulates the behaviour, actions, and 
processes of employers when they consider dismissal.16 Other commentators have 
supported this assessment. 17  The legislation seeks to promote fairness in the 
workplace, whilst limiting any restriction on the ability of employers to make business 
                                                 
8 The most recent of these is Council Directive 2006/54/EC of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men 
and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L204/23. 
9 M Connolly, Discrimination Law (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 183. 
10 Ibid 16. 
11 Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010) s 39. 
12 EqA 2010, s 39(2)(c). 
13 Collins (n 1) 11-22. 
14 Ibid 22. 
15 Ibid 16. 
16 Ibid 17.  
17 T Brodtkorb ‘Employee Misconduct and Unfair Dismissal law: Does the range of 
reasonable responses test require reform?’ (2010) 52 Int JLM 434. 
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decisions.18  
 
The purpose of anti-discrimination law has likewise been linked to notions of 
individual human dignity.19 However, anti-discrimination law also has a more general 
societal purpose. 20 Commentators view this broader motivation through different 
perspectives such as ethical (equal opportunities), political/democratic (free 
participation in society), or economic (benefits of merit-based recruitment and 
advancement);21 but all ultimately regard statutory intervention to prevent workplace 
discrimination as fulfilling a societal, as well an individual, need.22 Because of this 
over-arching purpose, anti-discrimination law positively requires employers ‘to 
operate employment practices that are sufficiently sensitive to the needs of the 
vulnerable group to eradicate unequal treatment caused by prejudice, stereotyping 
and other tangible and intangible barriers to the workplace’.23 As such, it potentially 
involves greater judicial input in the way that employers run their businesses than 
unfair dismissal law.24 
 
1.3 Defining dismissal 
The ERA and EqA define dismissal in similar terms. This includes dismissal by notice 
(or otherwise), non-re-engagement of a fixed-term contract, and constructive 
dismissal.25 The latter occurs when an employee resigns in circumstances where they 
would have been entitled to terminate the contract without notice due to employer 
conduct. 26  In other words, where an employer’s actions constitute a repudiatory 
breach of contract and the employee resigns in response to this breach, this will be 
                                                 
18 Deakin & Morris (n 5) 597. 
19 K Monaghan, Monaghan on Equality Law (2nd edn, OUP 2013) 16. 
20 Hepple (n 6) 16. 
21 Deakin & Morris (n 5) 601; Monaghan (n 19) 13-16. 
22 Hepple (n 6) 17. 
23 J Davies, ‘A Cuckoo in the nest? A “range of reasonable responses” justification and 
the Disability Discrimination Act 1995’ (2003) 32 ILJ 164, 177. 
24 Ibid 178; Deakin & Morris (n 5) 596-7. 
25 Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996) s 95(1); EqA 2010, s 39(7). 
26 ERA 1996, s 95(1)(c); EqA 2010, s 39(7)(b). 
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classed as a dismissal under both pieces of legislation.27 
 
1.4 Entitlement to claim 
In order to claim unfair dismissal, the individual must be working under a contract of 
employment.28 Defining a contract of employment is a complex area of law beyond 
the immediate scope of this dissertation, but it excludes both the self-employed, and 
those who work on contracts that do not involve a close mutuality of obligation in 
terms of hours offered or accepted. 29  Individuals working under an employment 
contract must have had (in most circumstances) at least two years' service prior to 
their dismissal.30  
 
There is no length of service requirement for a discrimination claim, and the EqA’s 
definition of employee is considerably wider than that of the ERA; encompassing those 
on casual or ‘zero hour’ contracts, though still excluding the genuinely self-
employed. 31  The protected characteristics under which protection from 
discrimination is potentially provided are race, age, disability, sex, sexual orientation, 
pregnancy, marital status, religion or belief, and gender reassignment.32 
 
1.5 Stages of an unfair dismissal claim 
Despite the large amount of case law it inspires, unfair dismissal is at its heart a 
statutory concept and any claim must meet the tests laid out in what is today ERA s 
98.33 Section 98(1) requires the employer to show the reason for the dismissal, and 
demonstrate that it fell within one of the prescribed categories listed in section 
                                                 
27 Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp [1978] QB 761 (CA). 
28 ERA 1996, s 230(1). 
29 For further discussion on this point, see I Smith & others, Smith and Wood’s 
Employment Law (13th edn, OUP 2017) 47-54. 
30 ERA 1996, s 108. This service requirement is removed in some limited 
circumstances; usually where the dismissal is directly connected to the employer’s 
assertion of a statutory right. 
31 EqA 2010, s 83(2)(a). 
32 EqA 2010, s 4. 
33 Smith & others (n 29) 511. 
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98(2).34 If it does, and the tribunal is satisfied that this was the genuine reason, then 
the dismissal is considered potentially fair.35 
 
1.5.1 Potentially fair reasons for dismissal 
The precise categories of potentially fair dismissals are; conduct of the employee, 
capability or qualifications, redundancy, contravention of statute, or some other 
substantial reason. 36  They are broadly defined and it is rare that any reason for 
dismissal other than those directly forbidden in sections 98-104F of the ERA will fail 
this first stage.37 However, if more than one reason is given, or the employee disputes 
that the reason given is correct; the tribunal will consider what was the chief 
motivating factor of the employer when making the decision to dismiss.38 
 
A conduct dismissal occurs where an employee has breached the employer’s rules or 
procedures; or has otherwise behaved in a manner that is incompatible with the 
employer’s business interests.39 Such a dismissal may be summary in nature, caused 
by a single act of gross misconduct that creates a repudiatory breach of contract.40 
Alternatively the employee may have carried out numerous smaller acts of 
misconduct prior to dismissal.41 
 
For an employer to dismiss for capability or qualifications, they need to demonstrate 
a genuine belief that the employee’s lack of ability, skill, knowledge or formal 
qualification justifies a decision to end their employment in that role.42 This is often 
the case if an employee has been absent due to sickness for a prolonged period and 
                                                 
34 ERA 1996, s 98(1) & (2). 
35 Beedell v West Ferry Printers Ltd [2000] ICR 1263 (EAT); Deakin & Morris (n 5) 525-
26. 
36 ERA 1996, s 98(1) & (2). 
37 ERA 1996, s 98(6). 
38 Maund v Penwith District Council [1984] ICR 143 (CA); Smith & others (n 29) 517. 
39 S Honeyball, Honeyball & Bower’s Textbook on Employment Law (14th edn, OUP 
2016) 178-81. 
40 Smith & others (n 29) 534-35. 
41 Ibid 536. 
42 ERA 1996, s 98(3). 
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there is little likelihood of them returning in the near future. 43  It can also cover 
situations where poor performance of an employee has a negative impact on the 
employer’s business, or where the employer has genuine reasons to believe that the 
holding of a particular qualification is necessary for the employee’s job role.44 
 
Redundancy arises when an employee’s role is no longer required by their employer’s 
business due to either a reduction in available work or the closure of a work location.45 
In practice, redundancy situations can be complicated due to re-structuring of 
particular departments, locations or roles.46 Where the employer has dismissed for 
reason of redundancy, a tribunal must be satisfied that the circumstances fit within 
definitions given in ERA s 139. 
 
Should an employee’s continued employment in a job role contravene another statute, 
the dismissal is also potentially fair.47 This might occur for example if the employee 
did not have the right to work legally within the UK.48 
 
Some other substantial reason (SOSR) is the remaining category of potentially fair 
dismissals and has been defined widely in case law; so much so, that some argue that 
it removes any check on employers imposed by ERA s 98(1).49 SOSR has been judged 
to cover economic motivations of the employer to re-structure work,50 refusal to 
accept a restrictive covenant,51 rejection of the employee by a major client,52 and 
many other situations that have led to an employee’s (intentional or constructive) 
dismissal.53 
                                                 
43 Honeyball (n 39) 175-76. 
44 Honeyball (n 39) 173. 
45 ERA 1996, s 139. 
46 Smith & others (n 29) 583. 
47 Honeyball (n 39) 188. 
48 Kelly v University of Southhampton [2008] ICR 357 (EAT). 
49 Deakin & Morris (n 5) 525-6. 
50 Chubb Fire Security Ltd v Harper [1983] IRLR 311 (EAT). 
51 RS Components Ltd v Irwin [1974] 1 All ER 41 (NIRC). 
52 Henderson v Connect (South Tyneside) Ltd [2010] IRLR 466 (EAT). 
53 See Honeyball (n 39) 189 for further examples. 
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1.5.2 The significance of section 98(4) 
Once the dismissal has met the criteria for being potentially fair, section 98(4) requires 
the tribunal to determine whether it is fair or unfair overall.54 This decision should 
take aspects of the employer’s business, including size and administrative resources, 
into consideration.55 Then, being mindful of equity and the substantial merits of each 
case, the tribunal decides whether the employer’s actions were reasonable or 
unreasonable.56 This assessment is the critical point in most unfair dismissal claims.57 
Chapter two of this dissertation will examine its interpretation in detail. 
 
1.6 Stages of a discrimination claim 
Under the EqA, the first stage of a discrimination claim is to identify the protected 
characteristic under which discrimination occurred.58 The second stage identifies the 
type of discriminatory conduct.59 The third step is to place this conduct within the 
context of one or more of the specifically prohibited circumstances outlined within 
the EqA.60 
 
This creates a wide range of potential routes for a discrimination claim. This 
dissertation will focus on those that can both relate to dismissal from employment 
and be potentially justified by an employer on grounds of proportionality.61 The three 
categories of potentially discriminatory conduct that meet these criteria are indirect 
discrimination,62 discrimination arising from disability,63 and direct discrimination on 
                                                 
54 ERA 1996, s 98(4). 
55 ERA 1996, s 98(4)(a). 
56 ERA 1996, s 98(4)(a) & (b). 
57 Deakin & Morris (n 5) 505-06. 
58 EqA 2010, pt 2 ch 1. 
59 EqA 2010, pt 2 ch2. 
60 EqA 2010, pt 5 ch 1. 
61 Other forms of discrimination that do not meet this criteria such as direct 
discrimination that is not age-related, or failure to provide reasonable adjustments 
for a disabled employee, will not be considered within this dissertation. 
62 EqA 2010, s 19. 
63 EqA 2010, s 15. 
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grounds of age.64  
 
1.6.1 Indirect Discrimination 
The prohibition of indirect discrimination is intended to promote equality of outcomes 
rather than merely equal treatment.65 It can occur where an employer applies an 
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice (PCP) to the employee.66 This could 
be an organisational rule, policy, performance target, or less formal expectation of 
conduct or appearance in the workplace.67 For a claim to succeed, the employee must 
demonstrate that this PCP places both them, and other members of a (real or 
hypothetical) group with whom they share a protected characteristic at a particular 
disadvantage.68 This requires comparison with a different group who do not share the 
same characteristic.69 Examples of indirect discrimination in dismissal situations often 
relate to an employee’s refusal to comply with standard organisational policies 
including working hours70 or dress codes.71 However, if the employer successfully 
argues that the PCP was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, no 
unlawful discrimination will have occurred.72  
 
1.6.2 Discrimination arising from disability 
Discrimination arising from disability is a separate category of prohibited conduct that 
was created by the EqA, though it has origins in a similar claim for disability-related 
discrimination formerly within the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.73 Here the focus 
is on the disabled employee as an individual and there is no requirement for a 
                                                 
64 EqA 2010, s 13(1) & (2). 
65 Hepple  (n 6) 64. 
66 EqA 2010, s 19(1). 
67 Honeyball (n 39) 258. 
68 EqA 2010, s 19(2)(b) & (c). 
69 EqA 2010, s 19(2)(a). 
70 Mba v Merton London Borough Council [2013] EWCA Civ 1562; [2014] 1 WLR 1501. 
71 Ladele v Islington London Borough Council [2009] EWCA Civ 1357; [2010] 1 WLR 
955. 
72 EqA 2010, s 19(2)(d). 
73 Smith & others (n 29) 344. 
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comparator.74 Instead the employee must demonstrate that their treatment by the 
employer was unfavourable, and that this is due to something arising in consequence 
of their disability.75  
 
Tribunals have applied a loose test of causation between the employee’s disability and 
the treatment they have received, meaning that it can be a powerful and wide-ranging 
claim for a dismissed employee to make. 76  However, again, if the employer 
successfully argues that their actions were a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim, no unlawful discrimination will have occurred.77 
 
1.6.3 Direct age discrimination 
Direct discrimination occurs when an employee is treated unfavourably in comparison 
with others because of a protected characteristic. 78  A justification defence is 
unavailable unless the discrimination is based on age.79 In situations involving the 
latter, the employer may argue that their actions were a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim.80 
 
1.6.4 Significance of a justification defence 
Indirect discrimination, discrimination arising from disability, and direct age 
discrimination claims can all potentially be applied to workplace dismissals.81 It is not 
necessary to prove any deliberate intention of the employer to discriminate when a 
prima facie case for discrimination is made by the employee.82 An employer is likely 
to argue that their PCP or other actions were instead motivated by factors such as 
                                                 
74 Hepple (n 6) 74. 
75 EqA 2010, s 15(1)(a). 
76 For example, in Risby v Waltham Forest London Borough Council (EAT, 18 March 
2016) an employee successfully argued that their dismissal for shouting at colleagues 
using racist and inappropriate language was related to pain and frustration caused 
by his disability. 
77 EqA 2010, s 15(1)(b). 
78 EqA 2010, s 13(1). 
79 EqA 2010, s 13(2). 
80 EqA 2010, s 13(2). 
81 EqA 2010, s 39(2)(c). 
82 Connolly (n 9) 154. 
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business need.83 For these reasons, the justification defence (under which the burden 
of proof shifts to the employer) is highly significant to the operation of the law in this 
area.84 Chapter three will examine it further. 
 
1.7 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to summarise the law on unfair dismissal, indirect 
discrimination, discrimination arising from disability, and direct age discrimination as 
they relate to dismissal from employment. Methods for justification applying to these 
claims have been identified as pivotal aspects of an employer’s defence. Therefore, 
even if an employee has the right to protection against unfair dismissal, they may still 
be lawfully dismissed so long as the employer’s actions are considered reasonable. 
Likewise, even if an employee is able to demonstrate that their dismissal was indirectly 
discriminatory, arose from reasons connected to disability, or was direct age 
discrimination, the employer will not have acted unlawfully if their actions were a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. The following chapters will 
examine these tests closely. 
 
This chapter has also looked briefly at the underlying purposes behind these areas of 
statutory protection. The concepts of individual dignity and autonomy are crucial to 
all. However, anti-discrimination law is also based on concepts of broader societal 
benefit that are wider than and go beyond the aims of unfair dismissal. This may prove 
an important point of consideration further on in this dissertation when the tests of 
reasonableness and proportionality are compared. 
                                                 
83 Deakin & Morris (n 5) 645. 
84 Connolly (n 9) 182. 
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Chapter 2: 
Unfair dismissal and the test of reasonableness 
 
2.0 Introduction 
Chapter one highlighted the pivotal importance of ERA s 98(4) in deciding claims for 
unfair dismissal. That subsection will be examined in depth here to identify the legal 
tests it creates, understand how these are applied in different types of dismissal, and 
to evaluate criticisms. The chapter will also explore the implications of recent 
comments from the Supreme Court in Reilly v Sandwell Metropolitan Borough 
Council.85 
 
2.1 Established interpretations of section 98(4) 
When adjudicating on the fairness or unfairness of any dismissal, a tribunal will make 
an error of law if it does not explicitly bear in mind the wording of this subsection as 
follows: 86  
 
Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), 
the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or 
unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer)- 
(a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the 
size and administrative resources of the employer’s undertaking) the 
employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a 
sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and 
(b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the 
substantial merits of the case.87 
 
This wording has remained substantially unchanged since the Industrial Relations Act 
1971 and as such, case law dating from that Act and its successors can still be relevant 
                                                 
85 Reilly v Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council [2018] UKSC 16; [2018] 3 All ER 
477. 
86 Conlin v United Distillers [1994] IRLR 169 (IH). 
87 Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996) s 98(4). 
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today.88 The burden of proof is neutral.89 
 
Firstly of note is the interaction between sections 98(1) and 98(4). 90  Simply put, 
section 98(1) requires the employer to establish a reason that potentially justifies 
dismissal of an employee.91 It is the purpose of section 98(4) to establish whether that 
reason justified the dismissal of the particular employee in question.92 
 
Moving on to paragraph (a), this demands that the tribunal asks itself whether the 
employer acted reasonably or unreasonably.93  Focus is thus laid on the employer’s 
actions and its justification for them, rather than considering matters from the 
employee’s perspective.94 This is emphasised by the highlighting of employer size and 
administrative resources as relevant concerns, without any explicit mention of 
matters such as injustice to the individual employee.  
 
The use of the phrase ‘reasonably or unreasonably’ at first might suggest a simple 
dichotomy of response in which the tribunal decides whether the employer’s 
behaviour fell into one or other category.95 However, when interpreting these words, 
judges must apply a high degree of restraint in their decision-making, and this makes 
the test less straightforward. As Phillips J in Watling & Co Ltd v Richardson explained: 
 
 [T]he fairness or unfairness of the dismissal is to be judged not by 
the hunch of the particular industrial tribunal, which (though rarely) 
may be whimsical or eccentric, but by the objective standard of the 
way in which a reasonable employer, in those circumstances, in that 
line of business, would have behaved. It has to be recognised that 
there are circumstances where more than one course of action may 
                                                 
88 A full summary of developments in wording for this subsection is given in Orr v 
Milton Keynes Council [2011] EWCA Civ 62; [2011] 4 All ER 1256, Appendix to 
judgement. 
89 Hackney London Borough Council v Usher [1997] ICR 705 (EAT). 
90 ERA 1996, s 98(1) & s 98(4). 
91 ERA 1996, s 98(1); Gilham v Kent County Council (No. 2) [1985] ICR 233 (CA). 
92 ERA 1996, s 98(4); Orr (n 88). 
93 ERA 1996 s 98(4)(a). 
94 Orr (n 88). 
95 ERA 1996, s 98(4)(a). 
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be reasonable.96 
 
This concept, later described in British Leyland v Swift as the ‘band of 
reasonableness’,97 means that employer actions ranging from informal warning to 
summary dismissal in the same set of circumstances can potentially be seen as 
reasonable. 98 As this quote from the above case describes:  
 
An employer might reasonably take the view, if the circumstances 
so justified, that his attitude must be a firm and definite one and 
must involve dismissal in order to deter other employees from like 
conduct. Another employer might quite reasonably on 
compassionate grounds treat the case as a special case.99  
 
Reasonableness within the context of ERA s 98(4) is therefore a flexible, rather than 
static concept. This has had a far-reaching impact on the development of unfair 
dismissal law that will be explored further in this chapter. 
 
In the House of Lords case, W Devis & Sons v Atkins, the exact meaning of the ‘it’ in 
section 98(4)(a) was settled as referring to the reason decided on in section 98(1).100 
This is significant because it forces the tribunal to consider the reasonableness of the 
employer’s actions at the time the dismissal took place, rather than allowing for 
consideration of later evidence or events.101  
 
It is also worthwhile noting section 98(4)(a)’s use of the phrase ‘sufficient reason for 
dismissing the employee’.102 There is no suggestion here that an employer must have 
found dismissal necessary under the circumstances, or even that dismissal is the best 
option available to them. All that is required is that the employer’s reasoning for the 
decision is not insufficient overall.  
                                                 
96 Watling & Co Ltd v Richardson [1978] ICR 1049 (EAT) 1056 (Phillips J). 
97 British Leyland (UK) Ltd v Swift [1981] IRLR 91 (CA) [11] (Lord Denning MR). 
98 Rolls-Royce v Walpole [1978] IRLR 343 (EAT). 
99 British Leyland  (n 97) [17] (Ackner LJ). 
100 W Devis & Sons Ltd v Atkins [1977] AC 931 (HL). 
101 Ibid.  
102 ERA 1996, s 98(4)(a). 
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Section 98(4)(b) sets the tone by which the rest of this subsection is measured.103 
According to the Court of Appeal, the terms ‘equity and substantial merits of the case’ 
signify that reasonableness is not to be measured by technical argument or legal 
jargon, but in straightforward analysis of each individual situation.104 In addition, the 
word ‘equity’ can be viewed as implying an expectation of reasonable consistency in 
employer behaviour.105 
 
2.2 Summarising the test 
Section 98(4) is thus deceptively complex in its formation and impact. Its key concepts 
were summarised by Browne-Wilkinson J in Iceland Frozen Foods Ltd v Jones as follows: 
 
(1) [T]he starting point should always be the words of [the] section 
[…] themselves; (2) in applying the section an industrial tribunal 
must consider the reasonableness of the employer’s conduct, not 
simply whether they (the members of the industrial tribunal) 
consider the dismissal to be fair; (3) in judging the reasonableness of 
the employer’s conduct an industrial tribunal must not substitute its 
decision as to what was the right course to adopt for that of the 
employer; (4) in many, though not all, cases there is a band of 
reasonable responses to the employee’s conduct within which one 
employer might reasonably take one view, another quite reasonably 
take another; (5) the function of the industrial tribunal, as an 
industrial jury, is to determine whether in the particular 
circumstances of each case the decision to dismiss the employee fell 
within the band of reasonable responses which a reasonable 
employer might have adopted. If the dismissal falls within the band 
the dismissal is fair: if the dismissal falls outside the band it is 
unfair.106 
 
This particularly powerful breakdown of principles has proven so significant within the 
field of unfair dismissal law that it is often referred to simply as the Iceland test and 
                                                 
103 Orr (n 88). 
104 Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians v Brain [1981] ICR 542 (CA) 
550 (Donaldson LJ); Orr (n 88). 
105 Post Office v Fennell [1981] IRLR 221 (CA). 
106 Iceland Frozen Foods Ltd v Jones [1983] ICR 17 (EAT) 24-25 (Browne-Wilkinson J). 
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has been explicitly approved by the Court of Appeal on multiple occasions.107  
 
The Court of Appeal is also of the opinion that, where appropriate, the test from British 
Homes Stores v Burchell108 similarly forms an aspect of section 98(4) in identifying the 
reasonableness of an employer’s decision to dismiss.109 Burchell considered the level 
of proof required by an employer when dismissing for misconduct and set a three-
stage test as follows: 
1. Did the employer have a genuine belief in the employee’s misconduct? 
2. Was this belief based on reasonable grounds? 
3. Had a reasonable level of investigation been carried out in order to discover 
these grounds?110 
 
Where these three questions are answered in the affirmative, dismissal will usually be 
considered a reasonable response in the circumstances.111 The cases of Iceland and 
Burchell therefore form the foundation of tribunals’ interpretation of ERA s 98(4), and 
have impacted significantly on unfair dismissal law.  
 
Firstly, they give wide-ranging power to tribunals, as the question of reasonableness 
will depend on findings of fact that can rarely be challenged on appeal. 112  The 
reasonable responses test is based purely upon an analysis of hypothetical employer 
behaviour by first instance judges.113  
 
Secondly, because both Iceland and Burchell stress the importance of judging the 
employer by its own actions at the time of dismissal, this has led to a great focus on 
                                                 
107 Post Office v Foley; HSBC Bank Plc (formerly Midland Bank Plc) v Madden [2001] 1 
All ER 550 (CA); Orr (n 88); I Smith & others, Smith and Wood’s Employment Law 
(13th edn, OUP 2017) 527. 
108 British Home Stores Ltd v Burchell [1980] ICR 303 (EAT). 
109 Post Office; HSBC  (n 107). 
110 Burchell (n 108). 
111 Ibid. 
112 Smith & others (n 107) 522. 
113 Ibid 529. 
 22 
procedural fairness.114 The leading case on procedural matters, Polkey v AE Dayton 
Services Ltd, considered the problem of inadequate employer procedure preceding a 
dismissal.115 It concluded that even if following a fair procedure would have led to the 
employee’s dismissal, dismissing without proper procedure is still unfair in most cases. 
Subsequent cases have clarified that all such internal employer procedures and 
investigations must be judged as part of the reasonable responses test. 116  This 
potentially reduces industrial conflict by promoting opportunities for conciliation and 
internal review of decisions.117 However, as will be discussed further in this chapter, 
some argue that it has led to insufficient emphasis on substantive justice for 
employees.118 
 
As interpreted, ERA s 98(4) therefore contains a mixture of both objective and 
subjective elements.119 For example, in Alidair Ltd v Taylor the Court of Appeal argued 
that it was a subjective test, focussing on the employer’s right to decide its own 
standards of acceptable competence at work, 120  whereas Post Office v Foley 
highlighted the objectivity of the tribunal when assessing whether such a decision was 
within the band of reasonable responses.121 
 
2.3 Application of the reasonable responses test 
The reasonable responses (or Iceland) test has been applied to all categories of 
dismissal contained within sections 98(1) and (2), meaning that the principles of unfair 
                                                 
114 S Honeyball, Honeyball & Bower’s Textbook on Employment Law (14th edn, OUP 
2016) 197; Smith & others (n 107) 522. 
115 Polkey v AE Dayton Services Ltd (1988) AC 344 (HL). 
116 Whitbread Plc (t/a Whitbread Medway Inns) v Hall [2001] EWCA Civ 268; [2001] 
ICR 699; Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd v Hitt [2002] EWCA Civ 1588; [2003] ICR 111. 
117 Honeyball (n 114) 196-7. 
118 S Deakin & G Morris, Labour Law (6th edn, Hart Publishing 2012) 546. 
119 Smith & others (n 107) 525. 
120 Alidair Ltd v Taylor [1978] ICR 445 (CA). 
121 Post Office; HSBC (n 107). It could be argued alternatively that the employer’s 
need to act on evidence gained by investigation is an objective aspect of the test, 
and the tribunal’s assessment of whether their decisions were reasonable is 
subjective – Smith & others (n 107) 525-6. 
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dismissal remain similar whether that dismissal is for conduct, capability, redundancy, 
contravention of statute, or SOSR. Some general areas of consideration for tribunals 
have been established. The need to comply with proper procedure, as established in 
the section above, is one of these. Issues such as organisational consistency, length of 
service of the dismissed employee, and the size of the employer, are all likewise 
relevent. 
 
Employers are expected to act consistently towards their workers. Parallel actions that 
attract a minor sanction towards one employee should not normally lead to the 
dismissal of another without good reason.122 Arbitrary decisions and behaviour by 
employers cannot be supported by the reasonable responses test.123 However, given 
the need to consider dismissal situations from the perspective of an employer, 
tribunals place significant weight on their reasoning behind any such inconsistency.124 
Thus, so long as motives for inconsistency (including individual instances of mitigation, 
or conscious recognition that previous organisational decisions have been unduly 
lenient) fit within the band of reasonable responses, the dismissal may still be fair.125 
 
As required by statute, tribunals will also consider an employer’s individual size and 
resources. 126   For example, expectations of proper investigation, procedure, or 
consultation for a small business will be different from those applied to a large-scale 
multinational organisation.127  This highlights how unfair dismissal law rarely sets out 
restrictive rules or expectations for all employers.128 
 
                                                 
122 Hadjioannou v Coral Casinos Ltd [1981] IRLR 352 (EAT); Post Office [n 105]. 
123 Securicor Ltd v Smith [1989] IRLR 356 (CA). 
124 Hadjioannou (n 122). 
125 Proctor v British Gypsum Ltd [1992] IRLR 7 (EAT); Conlin [n 86]. 
126 ERA 1996, s 98(4)(a). 
127 MacKellar v Bolton [1979] IRLR 59 (EAT); Royal Naval School v Hughes [1979] IRLR 
383 (EAT). 
128 It is important to note though, that even the smallest of employers will be judged 
by the reasonableness of their actions in each circumstance - Henderson v Granville 
Tours Ltd [1982] IRLR 494. 
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Another, more employee-focussed consideration for the tribunal relates to length of 
service, which should be taken into account when an employer contemplates 
dismissal. 129 An employee who has given loyal service for many years may expect to 
be treated with particular consideration.130 In redundancy situations for example, 
tribunals generally have approved measures to place them at an advantage compared 
with employees with lesser service.131  
 
However, the Scottish Inner House case of BS v Dundee City Council has recently 
downplayed the importance of length of service.132 It argues the primary purpose of 
such consideration is to assist an employer in assessing the likelihood of future 
instances of misconduct or ill health, rather than being connected to any intrinsic 
concept of justice. This is hard to reconcile with earlier decisions such as Dobie v Burns 
International Security Service (UK) Ltd that did highlight the consideration of individual 
justice in these matters,133 but it is perhaps closer in line with general principles of the 
reasonable responses test outlined in the previous section. 
 
2.3.1 Conduct 
When a conduct dismissal has occurred, the tribunal is required to consider guidelines 
set out in the ACAS Statutory Code of Practice for Disciplinaries and Grievances.134 
These are mostly concerned with procedural fairness: emphasising the rights of the 
employee to know conduct expectations in advance, for allegations to be fully 
investigated, opportunities for employees to argue their case, and procedures to 
                                                 
129 Dobie v Burns International Security Service (UK) Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 43 (CA) 47 
(Donaldson MR); Strouthos v London Underground Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 402; [2004] 
IRLR 636. 
130 Taylor v Parsons Peebles NEI Bruce Peebles Ltd [1981] IRLR 119 (EAT). 
131 Thomas & Betts Manufacturing Ltd v Harding [1980] IRLR 255 (CA). 
132 BS v Dundee City Council [2013] CSIH 91; 2014 SC 254. 
133 Dobie (n 129). 
134 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, s 207A. 
Consideration of the code is mostly relevant for assessing appropriate compensation 
in successful claims, but undoubtedly has some influence over how tribunals 
interpret section 98(4). 
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appeal decisions made.135  
 
Thus, employers should have clear policies setting out expected conduct in the 
workplace, and the potential consequences for breaches of this. 136  However, 
behaviour from an employee that is obviously inappropriate (such as theft or violence) 
can in some cases fairly lead to dismissal without a specific organisational policy in 
place.137  
 
When an allegation of misconduct has been made, employers should apply the 
standards of Burchell prior to making any decision to dismiss.138 This, as previously 
described, means holding a genuine belief in the misconduct based on reasonable 
grounds, revealed by reasonable investigation.  Such investigation and belief do not 
need to reach the standards of criminal prosecution,139 and instead only need to be 
sufficient to fall within the band of reasonable responses. 140  This means that 
expectations of sufficient investigation will vary between cases. Tribunals are wary of 
criticising the conclusions of employer investigations.141  For them to re-examine the 
facts of a case from their own perspective rather than that of the employer is an error 
of law.142 This includes interpreting witness statements or drawing conclusions from 
evidence not presented.143 However, if the investigation is so clearly inadequate as to 
be outside of what can be considered reasonable, then dismissal will be unfair, even 
if a fuller investigation would have likely produced the same outcome.144  
 
                                                 
135 ACAS, Statutory Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures (TSO 
2009) 7-8. 
136 Meyer Dunmore International Ltd v Rogers [1978] IRLR 167 (EAT). 
137 Deakin & Morris (n 118) 537. 
138 Burchell (n 108). 
139 Ibid. 
140 Sainsbury’s (116). 
141 See for example, Slater v Leicestershire Health Authority [1989] IRLR 16 (CA). 
142 Morgan v Electrolux Ltd [1991] ICR 369 (CA); London Ambulance Trust v Small 
[2009] EWCA Civ 220; [2009] IRLR 563. 
143 Orr (n 88). 
144 Brent London Borough Council v Fuller [2011] EWCA Civ 267; [2011] ICR 806. 
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In some cases this focus on process has led to the fair dismissal of multiple employees, 
despite the employer knowing that not all were guilty of misconduct, because 
reasonable levels of investigation had failed to identify who the true perpetrator 
was.145 Hence, the quality of employer investigation and process prior to dismissal has 
a larger bearing on fairness than whether or not the employee actually carried out the 
conduct accused of. 146   This again highlights how the reasonable responses test 
focuses on justifications for employer behaviour, rather than justice for those 
disadvantaged by it.147 
 
Regarding such cases where substantive rather than procedural injustice is the main 
issue, guidance issued from higher courts on this subject sets a low bar for employers 
to argue that their actions fell within the band of reasonable responses. In Post Office 
v Foley, when attempting to describe a misconduct situation where dismissal would 
be clearly unreasonable, Mummery LJ used the example of an employee saying ‘good 
morning’ to his line manager.148 He argued that in any less extreme case ‘there is room 
for reasonable disagreement among reasonable employers as to whether dismissal 
for the particular misconduct is a reasonable or unreasonable response’.149 Tribunals 
are thus in practice unlikely to find that an employer has responded overly harshly to 
an incident,150 and where this occurs, such decisions are often overturned at appeal 
on grounds that they have substituted their own judgment for that of a reasonable 
employer.151 Overall, a dismissal for conduct is unlikely to be found unfair purely on 
                                                 
145 Monie v Coral Racing Ltd [1981] ICR 109 (CA); Parr v Whitbread & Co Plc (t/a 
Threshers Wine Merchants) [1990] ICR 427 (EAT). 
146 Da Costa v Optolis [1976] IRLR 178 (EAT). 
147 Devis (n 100) 952 (Viscount Dilhorne); Polkey (n 115) 363 (Lord MacKay); Smith & 
others (n 107) 542. 
148 Post Office; HSBC (n 107) [50] (Mummery LJ). 
149 Ibid. 
150 See for example, Tesco Stores Ltd v Othman-Khalid (EAT, 10 September 2001) 
where the dismissal of an employee for one instance of stealing items worth 
approximately £1.50 was held to be within the band of reasonable responses. 
151 See for example, Anglian Home Improvements Ltd v Kelly [2004] EWCA Civ 901; 
[2005] ICR 242 where the Court of Appeal overturned a verdict of unfair dismissal. 
The original tribunal had previously judged the employee’s failure to follow correct 
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grounds of substantive injustice.152 
 
However, this argument should not be taken too far. For minor acts of misconduct, 
the ACAS code makes clear that employers are expected to issue warnings rather than 
move straight towards summary dismissal.153 Likewise, the recent case of Newbound 
v Thames Water Utilities Ltd reminded tribunals that to conclude that an employer’s 
decision to dismiss was outside the band of reasonable responses does not necessarily 
mean that the judge has substituted their views for that of the employer.154 In that 
case, an employee’s dismissal for certain health and safety breaches was found to be 
substantially unfair on the facts. Tribunals are still theoretically entitled to make such 
conclusions; there just appears to be little clarity on when they should. 
 
2.3.2 Capability 
Capability dismissals tend to fall into two different categories: those relating to 
prolonged sickness absence, and those relating to substandard work performance. 
This results in different issues being considered, but the reasonable responses test 
applies to both.  
 
Dismissals relating to substandard performance appear, similar to conduct, more 
likely to be found unfair on procedural rather than substantive grounds.155 Case law 
focuses on the importance of reasonable training, clear procedures, and fair warnings 
in advance of dismissal.156 The employer should do its best to support the employee 
to carry out their role successfully before dismissal is considered.157 However, where 
belief can be evidenced that the poor performance has a significant enough impact 
                                                 
banking procedures a matter too minor to warrant gross misconduct. 
152 T Brodtkorb ‘Employee Misconduct and Unfair Dismissal law: Does the range of 
reasonable responses test require reform?’ (2010) 52 Int JLM 429, 436. 
153 ACAS (n 135) 12. 
154 Newbound v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 677; [2015] IRLR 734. 
155 Honeyball (n 114) 173-5. 
156 Winterhalter Gastronom Ltd v Webb [1973] ICR 254 (NIRC); Post Office v Mughal 
[1977] ICR 763 (EAT). 
157 Steelprint Ltd v Haynes (EAT, 1 July 1996). 
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(such as safety concerns) then tribunals will not always consider a full performance 
management procedure necessary for the dismissal to be within the band of 
reasonable responses.158  
 
In long-term sickness absence situations, the employer should attempt to gain 
accurate information regarding the employee’s condition via a medical report,159 to 
consult with the employee about opportunities for them to return to work,160 and 
consider redeployment to other roles if appropriate in the circumstances.161 Whilst 
each case will be considered on its own merits, failing to carry out these actions means 
that the dismissal may be considered outwith the band of reasonable responses. 
Procedural fairness, therefore, is highly important.162 
 
It could be argued though, that concepts of substantive fairness have a somewhat 
higher profile in absence cases, with the question of how long should an employer 
wait before dismissing being an important consideration in the case law on this 
subject.163 This goes to the heart of the conflict between an employer’s economic 
interests and humanitarian concerns for the employee.164 However, if the employer 
is able to argue that there are reasonable business reasons why they are unable to 
support the employee’s absence any further, the dismissal will usually be fair.165 
 
2.3.3 Redundancy 
Redundancy is different in that it is defined and regulated by a number of specific 
statutory rules separate to ERA s 98(4). This means for example, that issues of  overall 
employer justification when dismissing will often be considered as part of the 
                                                 
158 Turner v Pleasurama Casinos Ltd [1976] IRLR 151 (EAT); Alidair (n 120). 
159 East Lindsey District Council v Daubney [1977] ICR 566 (EAT). 
160 Spencer v Paragon Wallpapers Ltd [1977] ICR 301 (EAT). 
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statutory definition of redundancy, rather than the band of reasonable responses.166 
Likewise, for dismissals of over twenty employees within a three-month period, 
expectations of reasonable procedures will be largely set by separate statutory 
provisions.167 
 
However, for smaller redundancy situations, the band of reasonable responses test 
still plays a significant part in assessing the adequacy and fairness of an employer’s 
procedures before dismissal takes place.168 Williams v Compair Maxam Ltd laid down 
a list of considerations for tribunals in this situation, which include union consultation, 
fair ‘pooling’ and selection of affected employees, and the offer of alternative 
employment where available and appropriate. 169  
 
2.3.4 Contravention of statute 
Case law is limited on the role of ERA s 98(4) in dismissals for contravention of statute. 
Due to the necessity of the employer taking decisive action to prevent unlawful 
behaviour, expectations of procedural fairness can be lower than in other types of 
dismissal.170  However, if there is reasonable opportunity for the affected employee 
to be redeployed into another role where the contravention of statute would not 
occur, or the employer’s belief in any illegality is mistaken, then dismissal could still 
be unfair.171 
 
2.3.5 SOSR 
As described in chapter one, this category of dismissal has been defined widely by 
tribunals, 172 and as such, it is difficult to make general conclusions about the role that 
ERA s 98(4) plays.  
                                                 
166 ERA 1996, s 139. 
167 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, s 188. 
168 Watling (n 96); Wrexham Golf Co Ltd v Ingham (EAT, 10 July 2012). 
169 Willams v Compair Maxam Ltd [1982] ICR 156 (EAT); Grundy (Teddington) Ltd v 
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In terms of substantive justice, a tribunal is entitled to examine the reason for 
dismissal, but must do so from the perspective of the employer.173 In the case of 
dismissals - whether constructive or dictated by the employer - caused by changes to 
terms and conditions, the tribunal may conclude that the employer’s actions were 
potentially fair under section 98(1), and separately consider whether the individual 
dismissal(s) fell within the band of reasonable responses under section 98(4).174 A 
breach of contract by an employer can thus still be considered reasonable in these 
circumstances,175 despite some commentators’ arguments that this goes against the 
very principles of unfair dismissal legislation.176 The tribunal must ask itself if the 
employer reasonably considered that advantages to itself outweighed the negative 
impact on the employee.177 However, the tribunal’s ability to criticise an employer’s 
business plan is limited and thus, such dismissals are often fair.178 For example, in 
Chubb Fire Security Ltd v Harper, the employer’s decision to unilaterally change a 
salesperson’s areas of work was considered reasonable on overall business grounds, 
despite them knowing that this would cause a noticeable decrease in the commission 
the employee earned.179 
 
Likewise, if an employer can successfully prove that retaining an employee could lead 
to the loss of a significant customer or client, dismissal is likely to be reasonable.180 
Whilst the balancing out of employee and business needs should form part of a 
tribunal’s reasoning in all SOSR dismissals,181 the needs of the employer will regularly 
                                                 
173 Gilham (n 91). 
174 Ibid; St John of God (Care Services) Ltd v Brooks [1992] ICR 715 (EAT). 
175 RS Components (n 172). 
176 Deakin & Morris (n 118) 575. 
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overrule the question of justice for an individual employee.182 
 
Regarding procedural fairness, failure to follow an appropriate procedure will make 
an SOSR dismissal unfair.183 However, what is considered reasonable will be shaped 
by exact circumstances. Reference to disciplinary procedures, for example, is not 
necessary.184 In some cases, the test laid out in Burchell will be appropriate,185 and in 
others it might be something closer to consultation exercises used for redundancy.186 
This perhaps exemplifies both the flexibility and complexity of the reasonable 
responses test. 
 
2.4 Criticism of the reasonable responses test 
Despite its favour with judges, the reasonable responses test has been heavily 
criticised. It is accused of not being in line with the wording of ERA s 98(4), being akin 
to a perversity test in practice, and offering more power to employers then was 
intended by the legislation. These arguments will be examined in turn. 
 
2.4.1 Misinterpretation of statutory wording 
There are two ways in which the reasonable responses test is argued to have 
subverted the wording of ERA s 98(4). The first is its refusal to accept a fixed standard 
of reasonableness in employer behaviour. 187 Reasonableness according to the test, 
as already seen, consists of the entire continuum of behaviour that might be observed 
of reasonable employees as a whole. Only employer behaviour that is totally outside 
this continuum can be judged as unreasonable. This contrasts with stark statutory 
                                                 
182 Henderson v Connect (South Tyneside) Ltd [2010] IRLR 466 (EAT); Ssekisonge v 
Barts Health NHS Trust (EAT, 2 March 2017). 
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wording that categorises employer behaviour as either ‘reasonable or 
unreasonable’.188   
 
The Court of Appeal in Post Office argued that Parliament must always have intended 
for a range of reasonableness to be applied, for otherwise the tribunal would act on 
its own personal opinions rather than viewing matters from the mindset of a 
reasonable employer. 189  However, Freedland and Davies counter that given the 
wording of the statute, it is more likely that Parliament intended employer behaviour 
to be judged objectively based on the tribunal bench’s own perspective.190  
 
The second area in which standard judicial interpretations of ERA s 98(4) have been 
criticised is regarding the phrase ‘equity and substantial merits of the case’.191 As 
already described, under the reasonable responses test this is interpreted as 
promoting an approach to judgment that eschews legal technicalities or jargon.192 
However, Freer argues that it also implies an even-handed approach that seeks to 
balance the competing interests of employers and employees in a fair way, and this is 
not included in the reasonable responses test.193  
 
2.4.2 Perversity 
Some, including Freer, argue that application of the reasonable responses test has 
thus turned section 98(4) into a perversity test.194 This argument deserves careful 
attention. Wednesbury Corp v Ministry of Housing and Local Government (No. 2) sets 
out the standard test for perversity in public law.195 Courts can overturn decisions by 
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public authorities in situations in circumstances where those decisions are manifestly 
unreasonable, or perverse in nature.196 Public law is not the same as employment law 
and Wednesbury does not apply directly to employment tribunals, but the latter are 
accused of applying similar levels of restraint to their decision-making.197 A significant 
source for these concerns lies within the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) decision 
in Vickers Ltd v Smith, which decreed an employer’s actions could only be seen as 
unreasonable if ‘no sensible or reasonable management’ would have taken them.198 
Such a line of thinking, it is argued, prevents employer actions from being challenged 
unless they are perverse in nature. 199  An example often cited to support this is 
Saunders v Scottish National Camps Association where the claim of an employee 
dismissed for being homosexual was unsuccessful as judges felt that the employer’s 
actions could be supported by some reasonable employers at the time.200 
 
Attempts have been made to distinguish the reasonable responses test from the 
Wednesbury test. In Iceland, for example, Browne-Wilkinson J wrote: 
 
The statement in Vickers Ltd v Smith is capable of being 
misunderstood so as to require such a high degree of 
unreasonableness to be shown that nothing short of a perverse 
decision to dismiss can be held to be unfair within the section. […] 
This is not the law. The question in each case is whether the 
industrial tribunal considers the employer’s conduct to fall within 
the band of reasonable responses.201 
 
Clearly there are differences in wording between ‘no sensible or reasonable 
management’ and ‘the band of reasonable responses’ but it is difficult to see how 
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these approaches are distinguished in the context of ordinary tribunal cases. Logically, 
if an employment judge cannot assume that their own interpretations of a case will 
cover all possible reasonable outcomes within the range, then they must shift their 
own expectations of reasonable employer behaviour downwards.202 Yet, given that 
no evidence will be led in court of how other reasonable employers manage their staff 
in practice, it will be impossible for the judge to know the exact limits of how low to 
set those expectations to keep them in line with a purely hypothetical reasonable 
employer.203 Brent London Borough Council v Fuller for example - a gross misconduct 
case in which the Court of Appeal clearly struggled with semantics, and eventually 
produced a split decision - shows the considerable difficulties in establishing whether 
a tribunal has substituted its own judgment when it shows any criticism of the 
employer’s case.204  
 
The fact that the reasonable responses test is worded differently to that of 
Wednesbury thus does not mean that its results will always be distinct in practice. 205  
As noted earlier in this chapter, when the Court of Appeal asked itself what definitely 
would not fall within the band of reasonable responses of an employer, the only 
answer given was dismissal for saying ‘good morning’ to a line manager.206 Given such 
guidance, it is likely that the reasonable responses test has, at least on some such 
occasions, become a perversity test in reality.207 
 
Furthermore, even if the reasonable responses test is not entirely akin to Wednesbury, 
this is largely because of its unpredictability. It is subjective reasoning masked by a 
veneer of objectivity.208 As described by Smith; 
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The range or band test, therefore, does not magically allow tribunals 
to apply an objective standard whilst not substituting their own 
judgment for that of the employer; instead it allows them (a) to 
apply no meaningful objective standard, (b) arbitrarily to imagine a 
lower limit that is lower than their own to give effect to the band 
fiction, or (c) simply to apply their own lower limit and call it the 
band.209 
 
Different tribunals can therefore potentially make different findings of fact on very 
similar circumstances, with the result that the same dismissal might legitimately be 
judged either fair or unfair.210 The Court of Appeal has stated this inconsistency is a 
natural result of the legislation and not necessarily an error of law.211 However, it 
places doubt on claims that the reasonable responses test is objective in nature.212 
 
2.4.3 Power to employers 
The above arguments imply that ERA s 98(4) has been interpreted to presuppose 
fairness on the part of the employer. Judges have restrained their own ability to apply 
reasoned analysis. Instead, the reasonable responses test requires that they only 
intervene in extreme cases where the employer’s actions are very clearly in the 
wrong.213 Collins describes how this occurs: 
 
In the middle range of cases, where the dismissal was clearly neither 
fair nor unfair, if the tribunal asks whether the employer’s decision 
was reasonable, the question tends to lead to a negative response 
and a finding of unfairness. If, on the other hand, the tribunal asks 
whether the employer’s decision was unreasonable, the question 
tends to shift the middle ground into the realm of fair dismissals. […] 
In short, the effect […] is to create a presumption of fairness and 
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excuse for non-intervention.214 
 
Freer argues similarly: 
 
By implementing the range of reasonable responses test, the 
question effectively becomes ‘is it possible that the employer is 
acting reasonably, or is the employer acting wholly unreasonably?’ 
Given that the answer must be one or the other, the outcome in the 
majority of cases is inevitable.215 
 
These arguments should not be overstated. Clearly, the reasonable responses test 
does not prevent employees from winning unfair dismissal cases regularly. However, 
as found earlier in the chapter (with possible exceptions for dismissals for long-term 
sickness absence or SOSR) this is most likely to happen in situations of procedural 
unfairness, where it can objectively be argued that an employer has not followed its 
own policies, practices, or external codes of practice. Findings of unfair dismissal for 
reasons of substantive injustice – where the employer’s actions may be procedurally 
correct but still unreasonable – appear less common.216 
 
The 1999 case of Haddon v Van Den Bergh Foods Ltd attempted to move away from 
the reasonable responses test for these reasons.217 It involved a catering employee 
dismissed for refusing to complete the last one and a half hours of his shift at his own 
long-service awards event after drinking alcohol provided free by the employer. The 
original tribunal had found dismissal in these circumstances within the range of 
reasonable responses and thus fair. On appeal, the employee successfully argued that 
judges should consider their own sense of reasonableness rather than solely rely on 
that of the hypothetical reasonable employer, as to do latterly produced a test of 
unfairness by perversity alone. 218  This EAT case was followed swiftly by others, 
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including Midland Bank Plc v Madden.219 Yet in a joint Court of Appeal judgment for 
the latter case, such arguments against the reasonable responses test were swiftly 
dispensed with as being incompatible with previous authorities and the opposing 
Iceland approach directly approved.220 
 
Why courts should place so much value on employer expertise and judgment can be 
questioned.221 Unlike in public law, there should be no assumption that employment 
dismissals have been motivated by overall public benefit.222 Employers have their own 
vested business interests to consider, and these are often at odds with protecting the 
employment rights of individual staff.223 Neither can all employers be assumed to 
have expertise in best practice human resources. 224  Simply because a practice is 
common within the business world, it does not mean that it is sensible, reasonable, 
or fair.  
 
Courts have often articulated the importance of considering matters from an 
employer’s rather than employee’s perspective, but relatively little time has been 
taken to explain why such an approach makes for fairer judgments.225 In Watling, 
Phillips J described how: 
 
[I]f an industrial tribunal equates its view of what itself would have 
done with what a reasonable employer would have done, it may 
mean that an employer will be found to have dismissed an employee 
unfairly even though many perfectly good and fair employers would 
have done as that employer did.226  
 
The counterpoint to this argument - that an employee could have been fairly 
dismissed even though many employers would consider that unreasonable - goes 
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unrecorded. One possible argument though, is that as it is employers who bear the 
legal penalties for unfairly dismissing an employee, it is Parliament’s intention that 
they be judged solely by standards over which they have control.227 Thus overall, it 
could be argued that the reasonable responses test allows employers to create their 
own rulebooks, and so long as these rules are adhered to, there is often little that a 
dismissed employee can do to challenge this, except in the most obviously arbitrary 
and unfair of circumstances.228 
 
2.5 Potential developments in the reasonable responses test 
Despite criticism, interpretation of ERA s 98(4) has appeared settled for many years. 
A further attempt to review the test in Orr v Milton Keynes Council in 2011 was 
dispelled by the Court of Appeal.229 Therefore, recent comments by Lord Wilson and 
Baroness Hale of the Supreme Court in Reilly have caused surprise.230 The case was 
not expected to have had any impact on the interpretation of ERA s 98 and neither 
party argued thus. However, in a judgment approved by the majority of the bench, 
Lord Wilson made several obiter remarks to state that the accepted view of Burchell’s 
tripartite test forming part of section 98(4) was false. Instead, the test should fall 
within sections 98(1) and (2).231  In a separate judgment, Baroness Hale agreed with 
this reasoning.232  
 
Setting the entire Burchell test within sections 98(1) and (2) contradicts the existing 
authority of Post Office.233 It means that arguments regarding grounds for belief in 
misconduct and the reasonableness of the investigation that created those grounds 
become attached to the reason for the employee’s dismissal, rather than the 
reasonableness of it.234 In a technical sense, this changes the two-stage test for unfair 
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dismissal that was outlined in chapter one. Instead of having a ‘low-bar’ first stage 
where the employer is required simply to demonstrate a genuine belief in the 
employee’s misconduct in order to establish a potentially fair reason for dismissal, this 
aspect of the test becomes more demanding for the employer. The fairness of the 
investigation and the employer’s interpretation of its findings would have to be 
successfully proven prior to any consideration of whether the decision to dismiss on 
those grounds was reasonable. 
 
This could alter the outcome of some tribunal cases for two reasons. Firstly, that 
whereas ERA s 98(4) has a neutral burden of proof,235 sections 98 (1) and (2) place the 
burden of proof on the employer, and this could make an employer’s case more 
difficult to establish. Secondly, it was argued in the (later overruled) EAT decision in 
Midland that if the Burchell test was only relevant to sections 98(1) & (2), then the 
reasonable responses test would no longer apply to it, potentially allowing for less 
restraint in a tribunal’s reasoning.236 The reasonable responses test would still apply 
to section 98(4), but the number of matters to be decided under it would be fewer. 
Deakin and Morris have argued previously that there is ‘clear authority in the statutory 
scheme’ for such separation in the questions of reason for and reasonableness of 
dismissal.237 
 
The significance of any shift to the burden of proof should not be overstated, as 
Burchell itself was initially decided before the burden of proof for ERA s 98(4) became 
neutral238 and that later shift is not considered to have had a great impact on unfair 
dismissal law.239 However, the potential dilution of the reasonable responses test is a 
more important matter to consider. 
 
Lord Wilson’s judgment in Reilly does not suggest significant change to the scope of 
                                                 
235 Hackney (n 89). 
236 Midland (n 219). 
237 Deakin & Morris (n 118) 529. See also Freedland (n 190) 293. 
238 Honeyball (n 114) 182. 
239 Smith & others (n 107) 521; Deakin & Morris (n 118) 526. 
 40 
the reasonable responses test, stating that ‘no harm has been done’ by 
misinterpretation of the Burchell decision by lower courts:240 
 
In effect it has been considered only to require the tribunal to 
inquire whether the dismissal was within a range of reasonable 
responses to the reason shown for it and whether it had been 
preceded by a reasonable amount of investigation. Such 
requirements seem to me to be entirely consonant with the 
obligation under section 98(4) to determine whether, in dismissing 
the employee, the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably.241 
 
Baroness Hale takes a slightly different view, noting in her judgment that the 
misapplication of Burchell could potentially make unfair dismissals fair, and fair 
dismissals unfair.242 However, despite this, she argues that to change settled law 
without very good reason would be ‘irresponsible’ and judges must note that 
Parliament has made no attempt to correct any previous errors in statutory 
interpretation.243 She ends her judgment with the words that ‘the law remains as it 
has been for the last 40 years and I express no view about whether that is correct.’244 
 
It is helpful to consider Reilly in the context of previous House of Lords decisions such 
as Smith v Glasgow District Council and Polkey as these are binding authority for the 
Supreme Court on unfair dismissal.245 The former may be particularly relevant as it 
considered the relationship between reasons for the dismissal, and its overall 
reasonableness. 246  The House of Lords was asked to consider whether a dismissal 
could still be fair if one of the conduct accusations behind it was not sufficiently 
evidenced.  Its decision was no, stating that the employer’s reasons for dismissal have 
to be considered in both stages of the test for unfair dismissal. If they are not 
sufficiently established, then the decision to dismiss for those reasons can never be 
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reasonable. Despite being post-Burchell,247 the Smith judgment does not reference 
that case and the exact question of which section of the ERA its tripartite test fits 
within does not arise. 248 However, instead it suggests (similarly to the comments of 
Lord Wilson in Reilly) that such technical considerations may be irrelevant as the 
sufficiency of grounds for belief in misconduct will be relevant for s 98(1), (2) and (4). 
 
Polkey can also be read as minimising the risk of Burchell’s reconsideration having any 
significant impact on tribunal decisions.249 Whilst a case about redundancy rather 
than conduct, it approves the view that the tribunal must consider the decision to 
dismiss from the perspective of a reasonable employer, and also states that ‘it is not 
correct to draw a distinction between the reason for dismissal and the manner of 
dismissal as if these were mutually exclusive’.250 Given this authority, it is hard to see 
how Burchell could be considered as exempt from the reasonable responses test. 
 
Overall, despite some excited commentary suggesting it marks the Supreme Court’s 
antipathy to the reasonable responses test,251 Reilly is unlikely to have startling impact. 
Given Justices’ obvious reluctance to make sweeping changes, and the previous 
authorities of Smith and Polkey, it is likely that the reasonable responses test will 
escape relatively unscathed. 
 
2.6 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has examined the origin, application, and criticism of ERA s 98(4)’s 
reasonable responses test. It emerges as a conceptually problematic, but resilient and 
staple provision of unfair dismissal law. It forces issues of procedural integrity to the 
fore, whilst arguably minimising aspects of substantive justice for employees who lose 
their livelihoods. Whilst statute remains the same, this is unlikely to change.  
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Next, this dissertation will conduct a similar analysis of the role of proportionality in 
the EqA when relating to dismissal from employment.  
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Chapter 3: 
Objective justification within the EqA 
 
3.0 Introduction 
Having examined the concept of reasonableness within unfair dismissal law, we now 
similarly analyse objective justification within the EqA, focussing particularly on 
dismissal from employment. This will demonstrate how objective justification is a 
developing, and in many situations, uncertain aspect of law.  
  
3.1 Justification Defences 
As chapter one described, dismissal from employment in discriminatory 
circumstances is unlawful under EqA s 39(2)(c). However, certain types of 
discrimination allow a defence of justification for employers.  If this is successful, the 
employee will no longer have a valid claim.252 
 
The three relevant defences are almost identical, consisting of the following: 
 
• For indirect discrimination, section 19(2)(d) allows justification where the 
employer demonstrates the PCP to be ‘a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim’.253 
 
• For discrimination arising from disability, section 15(1)(b) allows justification 
where ‘the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate 
aim’.254 
 
• For direct discrimination on grounds of age, section 13(2) states that ‘A does 
not discriminate against B if A can show A’s treatment of B to be a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’.255 
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Interpretation of the phrase ‘proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’ is 
applied consistently across all three types of claim.256 As the same phrase was used in 
pre-2010 equality legislation, case law from earlier statutes is still relevant today.257 
 
3.2 The European Background 
The EqA codifies UK obligations on equality legislation placed by various EU 
directives. 258  These directives use the phrase ‘objectively justified’ rather than ‘a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’.259 However, case law from the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 
this area is still binding on UK courts and tribunals.260 It is therefore important to 
understand the EU’s interpretation of objective justification in the context of equality. 
 
The leading case is Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz, which concerned a 
dispute over pensions for part-time workers who were disproportionately female.261 
The ECJ ruled that objective justification in an equality context meant that the 
measures chosen by the employer must ‘correspond to a real need on the part of the 
undertaking, are appropriate with a view to achieving the objectives pursued and are 
necessary to that end’.262 This judgment has been consistently highlighted within EU 
decisions regarding objective justification since.263  
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This legal test set out in Bilka places interpretation of objective justification squarely 
within the European legal tradition of proportionality. 264  As described by Lord 
Hoffman, this principle consists of three elements, namely: 
 
(1) [S]uitability: an administrative or legal power must be exercised 
in a way which is suitable to achieve the purpose intended and for 
which the power was conferred; (2) necessity: the exercise of the 
power must be necessary to achieve the relevant purpose and (3) 
proportionality in the narrower sense: the exercise of the power 
must not impose burdens or cause harm to other legitimate 
interests which are disproportionate to the importance of the object 
to be achieved.265 
 
By comparing this definition of proportionality with the Bilka test, we see that the 
elements of suitability (or appropriateness) and necessity are listed in both. Where 
Bilka differs from the classic formulation of proportionality is in its replacement of 
‘proportionality in the narrower sense’ with a strict edict of ‘real need’ on the part of 
the employer.266 The result of this is to demonstrate that EU law gives discrimination 
significant weight in the balancing of proportionality.267 For acts of discrimination to 
be justified by an employer, their overall objectives in pursuing such means cannot 
merely be convenient or advantageous. They must instead constitute a real need 
related to business or organisational efficacy.268 Substantive justice for the employee 
must therefore be at the forefront of a court’s reasoning. 
 
Such is the strict legal test that the phrase ‘a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim’ must correspond to.269 Whether judicial interpretation of the phrase 
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achieves this is a matter of debate, and requires close analysis of UK case law. To start, 
this will include consideration of a wide range of cases in order to ascertain legal 
principles. Further on in the chapter, we will consider how these principles have been 
applied to cases involving dismissal from employment. 
 
3.3 Legitimate Aim 
According to the EqA Statutory Code of Practice, the phrase ‘legitimate aim’ denotes 
that the treatment or PCP ‘should be legal, should not be discriminatory in itself, and 
must represent a real, objective consideration’.270 This guidance applies the approach 
of R (Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence, a Court of Appeal judgment that stressed 
the importance of Bilka.271 Therefore the objective sought ‘must correspond to a real 
need’272 that is ‘sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right’.273 It is 
for the tribunal to establish whether a legitimate aim has been demonstrated in each 
case, rather than relying on the subjective opinion of the discriminator.274 
 
In practice, it seems incidents where the respondent fails to demonstrate a legitimate 
aim are rare. Accepted aims within case law are wide-ranging and have included for 
example; the promotion of equal opportunities,275 the provision of Orthodox Jewish 
education to those of that faith, 276  compensating redundant employees for lost 
earnings,277 and the efficient provision of care services.278 However, one example of 
where an aim was not accepted as being legitimate is Allonby v Accrington and 
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Rosendale College. 279  This involved the dismissal of part-time workers following 
legislative changes that would have given them the same entitlement to employee 
benefits as full-time workers. Here, the Court of Appeal noted how: 
 
[I]f the aim of the dismissal was itself discriminatory (as the applicant 
contended it was, since it was to deny part-time workers, a 
predominantly female group, benefits which Parliament had 
legislated to give them) it could never afford justification.280 
 
This appears to demonstrate a fairly clear approach to defining a legitimate aim. Yet 
questions remain. For example, the Elias judgment emphasised the need to 
distinguish aims and means when considering justification.281 This implies that the 
legitimate aim must be a separate thing from the means that carry it out. However, in 
the later Court of Appeal case, Woodcock v Cumbria Primary Care Trust, where a high-
level employee complained of being made redundant without appropriate 
consultation shortly before his 49th birthday in order to reduce the financial payment 
due to him, it was accepted that making the claimant redundant was in itself a 
legitimate aim.282 It seems difficult to reconcile that the act of dismissal from which 
the discrimination claim flowed, could itself constitute a legitimate aim for that very 
act. It seems more likely that the aim that the respondent sought to achieve would be 
the running of a cost-efficient organisation, and the dismissal of a redundant 
employee in the most cost-effective of circumstances would be a means towards 
that.283 The Woodcock approach to legitimate aim was followed in Crime Reduction 
Initiatives (CRI) v Lawrence whereby dismissal of an absent employee was classed as 
a legitimate aim in itself.284 So far this surprising interpretation of the legislation does 
not appear to have been challenged. 
                                                 
279 Allonby v Accrington and Rosendale College [2001] EWCA Civ 529; [2001] 2 CMLR 
27. 
280 Ibid [29] (Sedley LJ). 
281 Elias (n 271) [145] (Mummery LJ). 
282 Woodcock v Cumbria Primary Care Trust [2012] EWCA Civ 330; ICR 1126. 
283 It should be noted that following Seldon v Clarkson Wright & Jakes [2012] UKSC 
16;  [2012] 3 All ER 1301, cases of direct age discrimination such as this would 
require an even stricter identification of legitimate aim. See text to n 287 below. 
284 Crime Reduction Initiatives (CRI) v Lawrence (EAT, 17 February 2014). 
 48 
 
The reason why courts may be reluctant to see cost-efficiency as a legitimate aim is 
the hesitancy with which the higher courts have allowed costs or economic reasons to 
be classed as such. Cost savings by themselves cannot constitute a legitimate aim, 
unless they are combined with other legitimate factors, 285  which can include an 
absence of means.286 This is a developing and somewhat uncertain area of law.287 
Questions remain as to what precisely constitutes a costs justification (as opposed to 
any other aim based on business efficiency or absence of means) and how tribunals 
should weigh up the different factors to decide whether cost considerations have 
been too high a factor in the discriminator’s mind. 288  These issues are often 
particularly relevant to cases involving dismissal, and so will be considered further in 
that context later in the chapter. 
 
Finally on legitimate aim, it is noted that direct age discrimination requires a more 
stringent interpretation of this than in other claims. This means that the aim must 
correspond with certain social policy objectives in the public interest such as inter-
generational fairness or dignity for older workers.289 
 
3.4 Proportionate Means 
Deriving the correct test for the phrase ‘proportionate means’ in UK law is complex. 
The Code of Practice lists two separate ways in which proportionality is judged. The 
first involves a balancing exercise during which a tribunal ‘may wish to conduct a 
proper evaluation of the discriminatory effect of the provision, criterion or practice 
[or treatment] as against the employer’s reasons for applying it, taking into account 
all relevant facts’.290 Secondly, the code follows on to describe how ‘EU law views 
treatment as proportionate if it is ”an appropriate and necessary” means of achieving 
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a legitimate aim’.291 
 
The balancing approach to adjudging proportionality mentioned above was initially 
developed in Hampson v Department for Education and Science.292 Balcombe LJ wrote 
how justification  ‘requires an objective balance between the discriminatory effect of 
the condition and the reasonable needs of the party who applies the condition’.293 
This was argued to be an equivalent test to Bilka,294 and was approved by the House 
of Lords in Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd.295 Lord Hoffman has previously argued 
that there is an English legal tradition of considering proportionality in a less 
structured manner to that of the EU, but which nevertheless produces the same 
results.296 The Hampson balancing exercise could be interpreted as one such example. 
Other commentators however, see it merely as a proportionality-avoidance tactic.297 
 
The House of Lords came to its decision in Barry v Midland Bank Plc using a similar 
balancing approach.298 Here, a redundant part-time female employee argued that her 
severance payment should take into account her many years of full-time work for the 
company prior to becoming a parent. Their lordships agreed that it was indirect 
discrimination, but could potentially be justified. They described the legal test as 
follows: 
 
[T]he ground relied upon as justification must be of sufficient 
importance for the national court to regard this as overriding the 
disparate impact of the difference in treatment, either in whole or 
in part. The more serious the disparate impact […], the more cogent 
must be the objective justification.299 
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Such consideration of the need to measure objective against impact reflects the 
European principle of ‘proportionality in the narrower sense’ explained earlier, but 
does not match the structured test set out in Bilka.300 The latter was cited in judgment 
however, suggesting that law lords considered theirs to be an equivalent approach.301 
The result in this case was that the bank’s aim of compensating employees for lost 
income was of sufficient importance to justify any disproportionate impact on female 
staff. No valid suggestion had been made of how the bank could achieve this same 
aim through any less discriminatory means.302 Other cases have concluded that the 
remit of any balancing exercise can also include the interests of society overall, such 
as discrimination in the wider community.303 
 
As the Code of Practice implied earlier however, this balancing approach no longer sits 
alone as the correct test for proportionate means. In Elias the Court of Appeal 
extended the test to bring it closer in line with the language of Bilka.304 As such ‘the 
objective of the measure in question must correspond to a real need and the means 
used must be appropriate with a view to achieving the objective and be necessary to 
that end.’305 Further on in the judgment this last aspect is clarified as requiring that 
the PCP or treatment be ‘no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.’306 
 
The inclusion of objective criteria such as appropriateness and necessity strengthens 
the Hampson balancing approach and brings the overall test of ‘proportionate means 
of achieving a legitimate aim’ closer in line with EU law. 307  Elias suggested that 
balancing detriment against seriousness of the objective is part of understanding 
                                                 
300 M Connolly, ‘Justification and Indirect Discrimination’ (2001) 44 Emp LB 4; Baker 
(n 263) 310. 
301 Barry (n 277) 1476 (Lord Nicholls); M Connolly, Discrimination Law (2nd edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 184. 
302 Barry (n 277). 
303 Ladele (n 275). 
304 Elias (n 271); Bilka (n 261); Lane & Ingleby (n 260) 535. 
305 Elias (n 271) [151] (Mummery LJ). 
306 Ibid [165] (Mummery LJ). 
307 Deakin & Morris (n 259) 643-4. 
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whether or not the means employed are necessary and reflect a real need.308 The 
Supreme Court has approved this approach. 309 However, some commentators argue 
that the full range of considerations included in the conjoined tests are rarely reflected 
in judgments of the EAT and Court of Appeal.310 This point will be considered in more 
detail later in the chapter. 
 
Part of this confusion may lie in the debate whether ‘necessary’ in the proportionality 
test is to be qualified by ‘reasonably’; and if so, what this means in the context of 
individual cases. The term ‘reasonably necessary’ appears in a number of Court of 
Appeal judgments including Allonby and Hardy and Hansons Plc v Lax.311 In the latter 
it was qualified that in this context, ‘reasonably’ does not imply a test of reasonable 
responses or margin of appreciation for the discriminator. Instead: 
 
The principle of proportionality requires the tribunal to take into 
account the reasonable needs of the business. But it has to make its 
own judgment, upon a fair and detailed analysis of the working 
practices and business considerations involved, as to whether the 
proposal is reasonably necessary.312 
 
The phrase ‘reasonably’ therefore appears to be an aspect of the balancing exercise 
between objective and impact. Some significant cases such as Elias have discarded it 
as a qualifier, given that it does not appear in the Bilka judgment.313 However, the 
Supreme Court in Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police and Seldon v 
Clarkson Wright & Jakes added an almost hesitant ‘(reasonably)’ before the term 
‘necessary’, and thus, the qualifier is likely to remain.314 
 
This shift of language is potentially significant, for the questions of whether a 
                                                 
308 Elias (n 271) [151] (Mummery LJ). 
309 JFS (n 276); Homer (n 271). 
310 Lane & Ingleby, (n 260) 531. 
311 Allonby (n 279); Hardy and Hansons Plc v Lax [2005] EWCA Civ 846; [2005] ICR 
1565. 
312 Hardy (n 311) [32] (Pill LJ). 
313 Elias (n 271). 
314 Homer (n 271) [23] (Lady Hale); Seldon (n 283) [55] (Lady Hale). 
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particular treatment or PCP is necessary to achieve the aim, and whether possible 
alternatives were sufficiently considered have remained common points by which 
discrimination claims succeed or fail.315 Usually, Bilka is interpreted as meaning that 
where an alternative, non-discriminatory means is possible, the measure cannot be 
justified. 316  This is reflected in the Code of Practice. 317  The judgment in Homer 
appeared to agree, so where a question arises about the justification of a particular 
means, ‘to some extent, the answer depends upon whether or not there were non-
discriminatory alternatives available’.318 However, the qualifier of ‘to some extent’ 
has allowed other cases such as Kapenova v Department of Health to conclude that 
the existence of non-discriminatory alternatives does not always prevent a particular 
means from being reasonably necessary.319 The Supreme Court recently re-affirmed 
the importance of considering alternative means in Naeem v Secretary of State for 
Justice and so it appears that cases where this applies less strictly are possible, but will 
be rare.320 
 
In cases regarding disability discrimination, this general expectation to consider 
alternative measures is amplified by the separate duty for organisations to make 
reasonable adjustments under EqA s 20. The Code of Practice makes clear that whilst 
fulfilling an obligation to make reasonable adjustments for a disabled person will not 
necessarily mean that further discrimination cannot be justified, any failure to do so 
will make justification in discrimination arising from disability cases very difficult.321 
York City Council v Grosset is one such example, whereby a disabled teacher 
successfully claimed that a failure to provide him with reasonable adjustments in the 
workplace was linked to later misconduct, for which he had been dismissed.322 This 
                                                 
315 Lane & Ingleby (n 260) 541. 
316 Hervey (n 264) 823-24. 
317 EHRC (n 270) para 4.31. 
318 Homer (n 271) [25] (Lady Hale). 
319 Kapenova v Department of Health [2014] ICR 884 (EAT). 
320 Naeem v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] UKSC 27; [2017] 1 WLR 1343. 
321 EHRC (n 270) para 5.21-5.22. 
322 York City Council v Grosset [2018] EWCA Civ 1105; [2018] 4 All ER 77. This must be 
distinguished from Monmouthshire County Council v Harris (EAT, 23 October 2015) 
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case is discussed further in chapter four. 
 
It is often important to consider in individual cases whether the balancing exercise 
requires justification of a general policy, or whether it is the application of that policy 
to a particular individual that must be justified. This point was clarified in Seldon as 
depending on whether the policy is a general one that is applied equally to all 
individuals, or whether it is one that allows treatment to be tailored to individual 
circumstances.323 In the former, only the policy itself requires justification against its 
impact. In the latter, such as in the application of absence or disciplinary policies, the 
treatment towards the individual in question must be justified.324 
 
GMB v Allen cautioned against the danger of including matters of remedy within a 
proportionality analysis.325 Thus, the proposition that a particular act of discrimination 
caused no or little loss to the claimant is not relevant to justification and should 
instead be reserved for a remedy hearing.326 Despite this guidance, issues of potential 
loss have occasionally been included within the balancing exercise of other cases.327 
 
Finally, the question of proportionality in cases where the legitimate aim of a 
particular PCP or treatment is only identified by the discriminator after its 
implementation has been raised on various occasions, including on appeal to the CJEU 
in Cadman v Health and Safety Executive.328 The settled response to this is that a 
justification defence in such circumstances can be successfully made, but is more 
difficult to prove and will be more carefully scrutinised.329  
 
                                                 
where the failure to make reasonable adjustments was a time-barred claim that did 
not directly relate to the later dismissal. 
323 Seldon (n 283). 
324 Ibid. 
325 GMB v Allen [2008] EWCA Civ 810; [2008] ICR 1407. 
326 Ibid. 
327 See for example Woodcock (n 282) [71] (Rimer LJ). 
328 Case C-17/05 Cadman v Health and Safety Executive [2006] ECR I-9583. 
329 Seldon (n 283). 
 54 
3.5 Level of appropriate scrutiny 
As implied above, a high level of scrutiny is applied to the arguments of both claimant 
and respondent in cases involving proportionality.330 ‘This is an appraisal requiring 
considerable skills and insight. […] [A] critical evaluation is required and is required to 
be demonstrated in the reasoning of the tribunal.’331 The tribunal is entitled to make 
its own interpretation of the evidence before it, including witness statements.332 The 
burden of proof is on the respondent to establish justification, but unlike in a 
reasonable responses test, the tribunal is not bound to respect their subjective 
viewpoint.333  
 
3.6 Application of proportionality to dismissal situations 
Prior to the EqA, dismissal situations that involved proportionality under equalities 
legislation were rare.334 Those that did occur related to indirect discrimination such as 
in redundancy situations, or where an employee refused to comply with a standard 
rule or policy. 335 However, following the introduction of the section 15 claim for 
discrimination arising from disability, the term ‘a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim’ is now regularly applied to dismissals due to long-term absence or 
misconduct.336 Interpreting the proportionality test in these new situations has posed 
challenges, and it is likely to take time for consistent precedents to develop.337 The 
following analysis attempts to suggest directions in which the law is heading.338  
                                                 
330 York [n 322]. 
331 Hardy (n 311) [33] (Pill LJ). 
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334 A previous justification clause in the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 for 
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337 Smith & others (n 252) 275. 
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There is relatively little evidence of structured proportionality analyses being applied 
by the EAT as regards dismissal situations. 339 Analysis is more likely to consist of 
Hampson-style balancing exercises that do not mention terms associated with more 
structured Bilka-eque analyses such as appropriateness and necessity. 340  It is 
surprising, for example, how rarely the Supreme Court’s judgment in Homer is directly 
cited given that it is the clearest and highest authority for proportionality analysis in 
the UK.341 Instead, judgments often do not cite any authority for proportionality at all, 
or use older, less vigorous authorities.342 Where an employer’s aim is decided to be 
legitimate, judgments often move very swiftly to a conclusion that dismissal was 
proportionate.343 
 
However, it is acknowledged that amongst cases examined, even amongst those that 
cite a balancing approach, there are examples of courts or tribunals embracing a 
critical and stringent approach to proportionality in dismissal cases. This includes re-
interpreting evidence, disagreeing with witnesses, and rejecting conclusions that do 
not adequately weigh up the perspectives of either employer or employee.344 
 
It has not yet been fully resolved whether courts may take into account medical or 
other evidence that was not available to the employer at the time of dismissal in their 
proportionality analyses. The EAT in Reid v Lewisham London Borough Council held 
                                                 
proceedings whilst in employment, but they are all situations where dismissal would 
clearly have been a likely outcome in the near future. 
339 Lane & Ingleby (n 260) 536. 
340 Ibid 538.  
341 Homer (n 271).  
342 See for example, Chivas Brothers Ltd v Christiansen (EAT, 19 May 2017), or Baldeh 
v Churches Housing Association of Dudley and District Ltd (EAT, 11 March 2019). It is 
also interesting to note how even the Court of Appeal judgment in McFarlane (n 
335) made no mention of the same court’s earlier judgment in Elias (n 271) even 
though doing so might have significantly changed the direction of argument. 
343 See for example, Mba (n 278) or McFarlane (n 335). 
344 Asda Stores Ltd v Raymond (EAT, 13 December 2018); Chivas (n 342); Hensman v 
Ministry of Defence [2014] Eq LR 650 (EAT). 
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that this was an error of law, yet the Court of Appeal explicitly took such post-dismissal 
evidence into account in York a month later.345 It is unclear whether Reid is therefore 
overruled on that point, or if the cases could be distinguished on the facts. The answer 
to this question could have significant implications for employers and their liability for 
discrimination. 
 
3.6.1 Conduct 
Relevant cases involving misconduct can be broken down into two main categories: 
those that involve an employee refusing to obey an instruction from their employer 
(usually on grounds that the instruction is indirectly discriminatory), and those that 
involve more traditional misconduct that was fully or partly caused by their disability. 
 
In the former, employers who demonstrate a significant legitimate aim for the 
instruction are usually able to successfully justify their decision to dismiss. Therefore 
in Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council the employer successfully justified 
their requirement for an employee to remove her veil when working directly with 
children on the grounds that it hindered their learning.346 This decision has been 
criticised for a lack of scrutiny given to alternative arrangements suggested by the 
claimant, and failure by the EAT to consider the wider discrimination which Muslim 
women experience in employment.347 
 
The exact legitimate aim identified by the tribunal can have significant implications for 
how likely dismissal is seen to be proportionate in these situations. For example, in 
Ladele v Islington London Borough Council the decision by that employer to insist that 
all its registrars were registered to perform civil partnerships as part of their equal 
opportunities policy was seen as its legitimate aim, rather than the means of 
upholding that policy.348 Therefore the suggestion that an alternative means for the 
                                                 
345 Reid v Lewisham London Borough Council (EAT, 13 April 2018); York (n 322) [29] 
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347 Lane & Ingleby (n 260) 542-3. 
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council would have been not to require all registrars to register to conduct civil 
partnerships, was discounted as irrelevant. By contrast, the accepted aim in Pendleton 
v Derbyshire County Council was simply to safeguard children in a school 
environment.349 The decision to dismiss the employee for remaining with her husband 
after he was convicted of a sexual offence was the means towards this. This allowed 
the EAT to consider alternative methods by which the employer could have achieved 
their aim, and the decision to dismiss was hence disproportionate. 
 
As regards other types of misconduct, we see a more consistent application of the 
need to consider alternative options than dismissal, and the relationship between 
dismissal and the employer’s aims is likewise often challenged. The Bilka requirements 
of appropriateness and necessity seem to be regularly applied, even if not often 
explicitly stated in judgments.350 This can be seen in cases such as Burdett v Aviva, 
Risby v Waltham Forest London Borough Council, Chivas Brothers Ltd v Christiansen, 
and Asda Stores Ltd v Raymond.351 In Chivas Brothers for example, the EAT agreed that 
application of the employer’s health and safety policy was a legitimate aim, but given 
that questioning of the employer’s witnesses revealed how the employee’s 
misconduct did not give rise to any particular health and safety risk, dismissal was 
found to be disproportionate on the facts.352 
 
However, the tribunal must still give significant consideration to the employer’s aims 
when deciding to dismiss.  Therefore, in Hensman v Ministry of Defence the employer 
was successful in appealing a disability discrimination claim because the original 
tribunal had not applied enough consideration to its reasons to dismiss the 
employee.353 
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3.6.2 Capability 
Case law relating to justification of long-term absence dismissal has grown rapidly in 
recent years. Tribunals generally agree that dismissal following long-term absence 
(where there is no evidence suggesting a likely return to work in the near future) is 
proportionate.354 However, the process by which such conclusions are reached varies. 
In particular, there is inconsistency in the identification of legitimate aim for these 
dismissals, even when circumstances are very similar. Examples of legitimate aims 
accepted in long-term absence situations include dismissal of absent employees,355 
efficient and/or high quality running of the workplace, 356  safeguarding of public 
funds,357 consideration of the impact on other staff members,358 supporting absent 
employees as much as reasonable,359 having a workforce that attends and carries out 
work required,360 and financial obligations to the overall organisation.361 To some 
extent we would expect a level of variation based on individual employer 
circumstances. However, it still could be argued that objective justification for long-
term absence would be more transparent if a more consistent approach to legitimate 
aim and proportionality was adopted by judges. Of course, an issue with this may be 
that absence management is often concerned with the saving of financial costs, which 
as previously discussed, cannot by itself be a legitimate aim.362 
 
The Court of Appeal attempted to provide some clarity in Bolton St Catherine’s 
Academy v O’Brien, emphasising that: 
 
In principle the severity of the impact on the employer of the 
                                                 
354 See for example Monmouthshire (n 322); obiter comments in General Dynamics 
Information Technology Ltd v Carranza [2015] ICR 169 (EAT) [47] (Richardson J). 
355 CRI (n 284) [6]. 
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362 See section 3.3. 
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continuing absence of an employee who is on long-term sickness 
absence must be a significant element in the balance that 
determines the point at which their dismissal becomes justified, and 
it is not unreasonable for a tribunal to expect some evidence on that 
subject.363 
 
Therefore, where an employer can demonstrate that the absence is causing a negative 
impact on their business, and the situation is unlikely to change, then dismissal will 
normally be proportionate.364 However, if evidence arises that indicates a likely return 
to work, or reasonable adjustments that might enable the individual to return, it will 
be much harder for the employer to justify dismissal.365  
 
In terms of absence management procedures prior to dismissal, if procedural error 
does not in itself cause discriminatory impact, it will not be relevant to justification.366 
However, employers are expected to interpret absence management procedures in 
the light of the EqA and individual circumstances. If failure to do so causes detriment 
to the employee, then this will make justifying treatment towards them more 
difficult.367 
 
In terms of dismissals for poor performance in the workplace, there is not currently 
enough case law to make general conclusions about how proportionality is applied. 
However, the very recent decision of Baldeh v Churches Housing Association of Dudley 
and District Ltd (which cited no case law authority for proportionality at all) suggested 
that a balancing exercise between the employer’s legitimate aim and impact of 
dismissal on the employee was the appropriate test.368 This reasoning, once again, 
seems closer to Hampson than to Homer.369 
 
3.6.3 Redundancy 
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In redundancy situations, establishing legitimate aim should theoretically be 
problematic due to the normal association of redundancy exercises with saving costs. 
However, tribunals have shown themselves very willing to accept this category of 
dismissal as potentially justifiable in practice. Proportionality analysis can be short and 
swift.370 Magoulas v Queen Mary University of London suggests a pragmatic approach 
to the consideration of alternative means in the context of genuine and lengthy 
periods of consultation prior to dismissal.371 However, if the tribunal is dissatisfied 
with an employer’s explanations of a redundancy situation or lack of alternative work, 
then dismissal will not be proportionate.372 
 
3.6.4 Other reasons for dismissal 
The Supreme Court has established that despite it being a clear example of direct age 
discrimination, compulsory retirement for employees of a certain age may be 
justifiable in individual situations if implemented for legitimate aims connected with 
overall social policy, and where the precise details of policy are seen as reasonably 
necessary and appropriate.373 
 
However, both Allonby and Redfearn v Serco Ltd demonstrate that when other 
reasons for dismissal are considered, tribunals will apply a critical scrutiny of both 
legitimate aim and its appropriateness to the circumstances.374 Such attempts by 
employers to construct artificial reasons for dismissal in order to avoid direct 
discrimination claims will fail the test of proportionality. 
 
3.7 Criticisms of the UK’s approach to proportionality 
As demonstrated, the correct test for proportionality in the UK has proven hard to 
grasp and patchy in its implementation. Some commentators have argued that this 
means that the UK is failing in its obligation to implement an approach that is, even if 
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not the same as Bilka, at least as effective in its results.375 As Connolly comments, 
‘there is a difference between requiring that the challenged practice goes no further 
than necessary to achieve the aim and requiring a balance of interests.’376  
 
It is thus argued that the loose replacement of ‘reasonably necessary’ for ‘necessary’ 
and ‘legitimate aim’ for ‘real need’ means that the UK’s test is weaker than it should 
be, and hence does not provide claimants with adequate protection. 377  Davies 
suggests that this particularly affects the judicial analysis of economic dismissals 
whereby too much weight is applied to the perspective of business rather than 
employee. 378  This chapter’s findings on inconsistent and sketchy approaches to 
proportionality in redundancy and absence dismissals could support such an 
argument.  
 
The UK’s approach to proportionality is also criticised for failing to take wider societal 
issues of discrimination into sufficient consideration in cases like Azmi. 379  This, 
alongside the concerns above, means that legislative policy objectives of the EqA are 
weakened.380 As Baker writes, 
 
When an employer pleads a justification defence […], the employer 
claims that its policy is not the kind of situation the statutes seek to 
prevent. Proportionality does the job of sorting acceptable 
situations from unacceptable ones. If the impact is proportionate, 
the measure is by definition not the kind on whose prevention 
society has placed an overriding priority. Why should this 
determination not involve consideration of whether this rule or 
practice, which the employer claims should receive exceptional 
treatment, brings about the kinds of effects that the statute seeks to 
eliminate or minimise?381 
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The UK’s preference for balancing exercises rather than structured proportionality 
tests, it is argued, makes judicial decisions on these matters less transparent.382 Lane 
and Ingleby go so far as to suggest that it has inadvertently allowed a unfair ranking 
system of protected characteristics to develop in case law that puts claimants of 
religious discrimination at particular disadvantage.383 Lack of clarity in legal tests could 
thus have serious consequences. 
 
However, the same authors also acknowledge that structured proportionality tests 
such as Bilka can be inflexible and do not always act in the interests of society 
overall.384  On the subject of what makes a perfect objective justification test, there 
are no easy answers. 
 
3.8 Potential developments in proportionality 
It is clear that areas of uncertainty remain in this area of the law. Given judges’ 
reluctance to consistently apply Bilka, it is possible that the UK’s planned exit from the 
EU and the potential end to any obligation to comply with its judgments will have a 
significant impact on the direction in which concepts of proportionality develop. As 
Ingleby and Lane point out, ‘if the UK courts failed to fully apply the jurisprudence of 
the CJEU prior to “Brexit”, it is unlikely that they will succumb to it now.’385 
 
3.9 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that despite being a clearly vigorous and stringent 
concept, it is hard to pinpoint the exact nature of objective justification within the UK, 
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especially as it applies to dismissal situations. Substantive justice is clearly more 
significant than procedural matters, but the exact application of the justification test 
appears to vary. Judicial interpretation is often inconsistent due to the challenges of 
combining English notions of ‘balance’ with strict European interpretations of 
proportionality. Because of these opposing influences, the UK’s likely exit from the EU 
in late 2019 may have significant long-term consequences for how the phrase ‘a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’ is understood in the future. 
 
Chapter four will directly compare the test of proportionality with that of reasonable 
responses as it attempts to assess how increasingly regular interaction between the 
two may further shape UK law relating to dismissal. 
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Chapter 4: 
Interactions between reasonable responses and 
proportionality 
 
4.0 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have outlined the tests of reasonable responses and 
proportionality as they relate to unfair dismissal and discrimination claims. 
Traditionally it was rare that these two separate claims would be applied to the same 
dismissal situation. However, as discrimination law evolves, this has started to become 
more common.386 This chapter compares the nature of reasonable responses and 
proportionality, and attempts to assess how they interact at tribunal level in dismissal 
situations. Such assessment is based on limited case law evidence, but indicates that 
this is a developing area that potentially could make managing dismissal a more 
complex process for employers; or alternatively could lead to changes in the tests 
themselves. 
 
4.1 Comparisons between reasonable responses and proportionality 
It is accepted generally that both tests are distinct.387 The reasonable responses test 
condones employer behaviour that lies within a normal range.388 It applies no higher 
standard than to compare the actions of one employer with those of (usually 
hypothetical) alternatives.389 By contrast, proportionality is a much stricter, value-
laden test that enables the court to judge the legitimacy of an employer’s actions, and 
to assess whether aims could have been achieved through less discriminatory 
means.390 Chapters two and three have highlighted these differences; the detail of 
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which can be summarised in the following ways. 
 
4.1.1 Intention and focus 
The intention behind the reasonable responses test is to promote fairness and 
reasonable behaviour by employers.391 Considerations of impact on the individual 
employee are secondary to these overriding concerns.392 It focuses on judging the 
employer’s behaviour based on knowledge they had at the time of dismissal, rather 
than any facts that emerge after that date.393 Case law thus centres on attempts by 
the employer to act fairly at the time of dismissal, at the expense of consideration for 
the individual employee, who may be treated unjustly.394   
 
By contrast, the proportionality test in its purest form applies a different approach. 
Discriminatory impact on the employee lies at the core of the tribunal’s concerns, and 
it is for the employer to argue that their legitimate aim is justification against this.395 
Chapter three described how the tribunal’s treatment of relevant evidence that arises 
after the dismissal itself is not yet set out fully in case law.396 
 
4.1.2 Alternative actions to dismissal 
It is accepted that a reasonable response by an employer can take various forms, and 
so long as an individual’s dismissal falls within this band, tribunals will not judge 
whether or not it was the most appropriate response for the circumstances.397 This is 
in contrast to the Bilka requirement that an employer must demonstrate that their 
actions when dismissing an employee constituted the least discriminatory method of 
upholding the legitimate aim in question.398 
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4.1.3 Level of judicial restraint 
Under the reasonable responses test, judges must not allow their own opinions about 
the facts of any case to influence the overall judgment.399 Instead, evidence is viewed 
from the perspective of a hypothetical reasonable employer. 400  This includes for 
example, the interpretation of witness statements, over which the employer’s view 
can only be disregarded if it is seen to be entirely unreasonable in nature.401 
 
Proportionality as described in Bilka has no such restriction on judicial interpretation 
of the facts.402 Judicial analysis should be objective and meaningful.403 Tribunals are 
entitled to interpret evidence as they see fit, and to challenge employer (or claimant) 
assertions where appropriate.404 
 
4.1.4 Procedural fairness  
ERA s 98(4)’s emphasis on fairness and reasonable behaviour by employers has led to 
a large focus on procedural fairness. 405 Employers should only make decisions to 
dismiss against a background of fair, consistent, and transparent organisational 
procedure.406 Failure to provide this is likely to lead to a finding of unfair dismissal, 
even if the employer can demonstrate that the dismissal itself was not unjust.407 Case 
law on proportionality shows a lower degree of deference to procedural fairness, so 
long as any irregularity in employer behaviour is not connected to the discrimination 
itself.408  
 
 
                                                 
399 Watling & Co Ltd v Richardson [1977] AC 931 (HL). 
400 Orr (n 391). 
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402 Bilka (n 398). 
403 Hardy and Hansons Plc v Lax [2005] EWCA Civ 846; [2005] ICR 1565. 
404 Ibid; GMB v Allen [2008] EWCA Civ 810; [2008] ICR 1407. 
405 Smith & others (n 387) 522. 
406 British Home Stores Ltd v Burchell [1980] ICR 303 (EAT). 
407 Polkey v AE Dayton Services Ltd (1988) AC 344 (HL). 
408 Crime Reduction Initiatives (CRI) v Lawrence (EAT, 17 February 2014). 
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4.1.5 Substantive Justice 
The reasonable responses test thus places little weight on substantive justice. 409 
Where it occasionally does (such as in some cases of long-term absence and SOSR), 
the employer’s needs usually take priority,410 as only ‘sufficient’ reason to dismiss is 
required. 411  By contrast, proportionality’s focus on the interests of the claimant 
means that substantive justice is a more significant aspect.412 
 
4.1.6 Power balance between employer and employee 
Both the reasonable responses and proportionality tests have been criticised for 
allowing the power balance in tribunals to shift towards employers rather than 
employees.413  Such criticisms levelled against the former test, which is held to be 
intrinsically imbalanced as an approach, have been especially fierce.414 By contrast, 
criticisms of imbalance in discrimination cases are usually triggered by a perceived 
misapplication of the principle of proportionality, rather than being something that 
inevitably flows from it.415 Where correctly applied, the Bilka test is considered to give 
greater power to employees than employers.416 
 
4.1.7 Objectivity 
Chapter two described how the reasonable responses test in theory contains objective 
                                                 
409 T Brodtkorb ‘Employee Misconduct and Unfair Dismissal law: Does the range of 
reasonable responses test require reform?’ (2010) 52 Int JLM 429, 443. 
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elements, but is mostly subjective in reality. 417  Chapter 3 established that the 
proportionality test is much more objective in nature, but that case law suggests it is 
regularly applied in a somewhat subjective manner.418 
 
4.1.8 Future direction 
The reasonable responses test is longstanding and well-established. 419 Analysis in 
chapter two argued how it is unlikely that the test and its application will be 
significantly altered in the near future.420 The proportionality test in discrimination 
claims lacks this settled status, particularly in how it is applied to dismissal.421 Various 
areas of uncertainty were identified in chapter three.422 
 
4.2 Interaction between both tests in dual claim situations 
In situations where a dismissed employee has brought claims of both unfair dismissal 
and discrimination arising from disability, tribunals may be required to apply both 
reasonable responses and proportionality tests separately to the same evidence. We 
now assess occasions where such cases have been considered by either the EAT or 
Court of Appeal. However, due to a limited amount of case law available, analysis will 
be restricted to dismissals based on long-term sickness absence or misconduct. 
 
4.2.1 Sickness absence 
An early dual claim case involving dismissal for sickness absence to reach the EAT was 
Crime Reduction Initiatives (CRI) v Lawrence.423 This established the separate nature 
of both tests, finding that an error in procedure by the employer was enough to take 
dismissal outside of the band of reasonable responses, yet did not impact on 
proportionality. This resulted in the employee losing their case for discrimination, 
despite the success of their unfair dismissal claim. 
                                                 
417 See section 2.2. 
418 See section 3.6. 
419 Orr (n 391). 
420 See section 2.5. 
421 Lane & Ingleby  (n 415) 549-50. 
422 See sections 3.3 and 3.4 in particular. 
423 CRI (n 408). 
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However later case law emphasises that where obvious procedural errors are not 
present, the issues with which tribunals must concern themselves are very similar for 
both reasonableness and proportionality. The Court of Appeal in Bolton gave the 
following guidance: 
 
I accept that the language in which the two tests is expressed is 
different and that in the public law context a ‘reasonableness review’ 
may be significantly less stringent than a proportionality assessment 
(though the nature and extent of the difference remains much 
debated). But it would be a pity if there were any real distinction in 
the context of dismissal for long-term sickness where the employee 
is disabled within the meaning of the 2010 Act. The law is 
complicated enough without parties and tribunals having routinely 
to judge the dismissal of such an employee by one standard for the 
purpose of an unfair dismissal claim and by a different standard for 
the purpose of discrimination law.424 
 
The judgment went on to explain that differences between the tests of 
reasonableness and proportionality should not be over-emphasised, as both allowed 
respect for the actions of the decision-maker and as such, should not usually lead to 
different results in this context.425 Quite how such argument can be squared with the 
contrasting theoretical doctrines of reasonable responses and proportionality as 
discussed earlier in this chapter is unclear.426  
 
However, what is clear is that the Court of Appeal believes that factors such as impact 
of sickness absence on the employer, and the question of how long they should wait 
before dismissing, are common matters for both unfair dismissal and discrimination 
claims.427 Other case law from the EAT has established similarly that issues such as the 
                                                 
424 Bolton St Catherine’s Academy v O’Brien [2017] EWCA Civ 145; [2017] ICR 737 
[53] (Underhill LJ). 
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426 The Homer decision (Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2012] 
UKSC 15; [2012] 3 All ER 1287) was cited in argument during Bolton, but notably, was 
not referred to in the final judgment. 
427 Bolton (n 424). 
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consideration of alternative methods of working,428 and the presence of implied terms 
regarding contractual sickness benefits, 429  will likewise be considered under both 
tests. It is unsurprising therefore, that other than CRI,430 all dual claims for sickness 
absence dismissal considered for this dissertation have resulted in the same result – 
either success or failure – for both claims. 431 In practice, the tests of reasonable 
responses and proportionality are very similar when applied to sickness absence 
situations. In Birmingham City Council v Lawrence for example, the EAT felt bound by 
Bolton to conclude that if a tribunal’s findings on proportionality were unsafe, then 
this meant that findings on reasonable responses must be unsafe also.432 
 
4.2.2 Conduct 
At first glance, case law on dual claims involving conduct dismissals appears to follow 
a similar pattern. In the majority of cases considered for this dissertation, the results 
of reasonable responses and proportionality tests have likewise produced the same 
result – whether success or failure – for each claim. Sometimes, such as in the cases 
of Hensman and Asda, these results are based on very similar analysis for each claim 
by the tribunal. 433  In Risby, the EAT described a ‘substantial degree of overlap 
between the two statutory questions’ which meant that a proportionality decision on 
alternative options to dismissal could potentially change the result of a reasonable 
responses analysis.434 
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However, at other times the EAT has considered issues of reasonableness and 
proportionality in quite separate ways. For example, in Burdett v Aviva Employment 
Services, where an employee with schizophrenia had committed very significant 
misconduct as a result of not taking prescribed medication, success in his unfair 
dismissal claim was largely based on the employer’s failure to consider the lack of 
wilful culpability involved.435 By contrast, the success of his claim for discrimination 
arising from disability arose principally because the employer did not consider 
alternative methods of achieving their legitimate aim other than dismissal. 
 
The recent Court of Appeal judgment in York was a significant development in this 
subject. 436  Here, a disabled teacher was dismissed after showing pupils an 
inappropriate film in class. Crucial factors affecting both claims were the perceived 
relationship between the employee’s disability and his conduct, and the level of 
remorse and reflection shown by him afterwards. The unfair dismissal claim failed 
because the tribunal decided that the employers’ opinions on these matters were 
within the band of reasonable responses and as such, could not be further questioned. 
However the discrimination claim succeeded because the tribunal applied its own 
proportionality assessment of the relevant evidence (including medical evidence 
unavailable to the employer when dismissing), which led it to disagree with the 
employer’s views. The Court of Appeal approved of both approaches, emphasising 
that the tests of proportionality and reasonableness were ‘plainly distinct’. 437 
Contradictory guidance from Bolton discussed above was considered by Sales LJ, but 
was distinguished on the facts of the case.438 Given the quote from Underhill LJ in 
section 4.2.1 above, these distinguishing facts presumably must relate to the reason 
for dismissal.439 
 
                                                 
435 Burdett v Aviva Employment Services Ltd (EAT, 14 November 2014). 
436 York City Council v Grosset [2018] EWCA Civ 1105; [2018] 4 All ER 77. 
437 Ibid [55] (Sales LJ). 
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4.3 Potential future directions for dual claims 
The Court of Appeal thus appears of the opinion that comparisons between the tests 
of reasonableness and proportionality will depend on the employer’s reason for 
dismissing the employee. In sickness absence cases, the tribunal’s analysis will be very 
similar for each test, yet in conduct situations they are likely to be quite different.440 
Given the substantial theoretical differences between reasonableness and 
proportionality explored so far in this dissertation, this guidance may be considered 
as lacking in principle. It is not easy to see why the interaction between the two tests 
should differ so markedly when sickness absence and conduct situations are 
compared. In other words, if a dismissal for conduct can be reasonable but not 
proportionate, why should it be different for a dismissal due to absence? It is likely 
that further clarification on this point will be required from the higher courts in the 
future.  
 
A particular area of note to consider will be how the tests differ in terms of evidence 
tribunals can consider, and how they use it. For example, York implies that evidence 
obtained post-dismissal will be acceptable for a discrimination claim, but not an unfair 
dismissal one. 441  Likewise, it implies that the opinions in an employer’s witness 
statement must be respected for the latter, but not necessarily for the former.442  
 
If different standards are applied to unfair dismissal and discrimination claims, this 
may create additional complexity for employers when dismissing staff. That is possibly 
a driver for some courts and tribunals to deliberately ensure that dual claim situations 
do not create two different results.443 Indeed, it could be argued that in cases such as 
Asda (where the EAT unusually upheld a tribunal’s decision to reject some employer 
interpretation of evidence under the unfair dismissal claim), the tests of either 
reasonableness or proportionality have been softened in order to ensure consistent 
                                                 
440 York (n 436). 
441 Ibid. 
442 Ibid. 
443 Bolton (n 424) [53] (Underhill LJ). See also comments within Sedley LJ’s dissenting 
opinion in Orr (n 391) [18] (Sedley LJ). 
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outcomes for both claims.444 If this was indeed the case, and it continued over time, 
then this could affect the long-term development of one, or both areas of the law. 
 
Another interpretation of the Court of Appeal’s position would be that it reflects 
general inconsistency in the application of the reasonable responses test. As chapter 
two demonstrated, it is much rarer for dismissals in conduct situations to be found 
unfair on grounds of substantive fairness than it is for dismissals in long-term absence 
situations.445 Tribunals are rarely able to argue that dismissal for a particular act of 
misconduct would be outside of the band of reasonable responses without any 
procedural concerns to draw on. Yet the similar question of whether the employer 
waited long enough before dismissing someone for long-term absence (in 
procedurally correct circumstances) is not only accepted as legitimate under the test, 
but is at the forefront of case law in that area. Therefore when both types of dismissal 
are considered under a proportionality analysis, sickness absence cases will often 
produce the same result as in unfair dismissal, whilst conduct cases could be quite 
different. Again, it is possible that the highlighting of this inconsistent trend could 
result in developments in how one or both tests are applied in the longer term. 
 
4.4 Chapter Conclusion 
Theoretically the tests of reasonable responses and proportionality are distinct in law. 
However, in practice the relationship between them proves to be complex, and likely 
to develop over time. It is possible that the on-going interaction between unfair 
dismissal and discrimination claims may result in long-term changes into how courts 
apply the tests of proportionality and reasonableness.  Even if this is not the case, 
employers may find unravelling the law of dismissal a much more complex process in 
the future. Thus, it is an area of law that deserves continued observation. 
 
                                                 
444 Asda (n 433). 
445 See sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. 
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Conclusion  
 
5.0 Summary of findings 
This dissertation began with the aim of identifying exact differences between a 
dismissal that was reasonable, and one that was a proportionate means of achieving 
a legitimate aim. The former is relevant for unfair dismissal claims under the ERA, and 
the latter is relevant for some discrimination claims under the EqA. The preceding 
analysis has demonstrated that such differences are easier to describe in theory than 
in practice. 
 
Chapter one explained the background to both unfair dismissal and anti-
discrimination law, and how both might offer legal protection to those dismissed from 
employment. Yet the underlying statutes are distinct. The ERA sought to provide 
avenues for individual dignity and autonomy in the workplace. The EqA was designed 
to provide more than this: to enforce societal expectations of equality and thus 
positively shape the behaviour of organisations. From the start, it was clear that claims 
of unfair dismissal and discrimination, though potentially overlapping, are different in 
various ways. Many individuals will meet the criteria for one but not the other. Where 
someone meets the criteria for both, they could hypothetically bring a dual claim.  
 
Chapter two examined ERA s 98(4) and its pivotal importance to unfair dismissal claims. 
Interpretation of this subsection has been consistently in line with the Iceland 
reasonable responses test.446 This is, that tribunals must consider the decision to 
dismiss from the perspective of a reasonable employer and not substitute its own 
opinion for that. Reasonableness is therefore a wide concept with few boundaries, 
other than those posed by procedural expectations. The test has been criticised for 
limiting the power of employees to challenge dismissal, but is ultimately a settled 
concept that is likely to survive the challenge of Reilly.447 
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Next, chapter three carried out a similar analysis of proportionate means and 
legitimate aim within the EqA. Due to European legislation and case law, this 
theoretically requires a strict test of proportionality in relevant dismissal cases. 
However, UK courts and tribunals have been historically reluctant to apply this. This 
may be partly because proportionality as defined, with its limitations on cost as an 
acceptable legitimate aim, poses intrinsic difficulties in situations such as redundancy 
and absence dismissals. Whilst over time the direction of case law has gradually 
moved closer to the Bilka test,448 less structured balancing exercises are still regularly 
used in practice and this arguably weakens protection for dismissed employees. It is 
likely that interpretations of this area of law will continue to develop, and the UK’s 
planned exit from the EU may impact on this. 
 
Finally, in chapter four, the tests of reasonable responses and proportionality were 
directly compared. In theory they are very different. However, analysis of dual claim 
situations for unfair dismissal and discrimination demonstrated inconsistent and 
confusing interactions between them in practice. Court of Appeal guidance in conduct 
and sickness absence dismissals appears contradictory, and no clear reason has been 
provided for this. It was suggested though, that the explanation may lie either in 
judges’ reluctance to make different conclusions on each claim when applied to the 
same facts, or historical inconsistencies in the application of the reasonable responses 
test. In either case, it seems likely that future dual claim situations will eventually force 
higher courts to confront this inconsistent reasoning, and, as such, may develop the 
application of one, or both, legal tests. 
 
5.1 Implications 
As has been argued, the reasonable responses test is settled law with authority 
extending all the way to the House of Lords. Therefore, it is hard to imagine any 
significant change to its application in the future. However, given the level of 
inconsistency within existing applications of the proportionality test, combined with 
likely uncoupling of UK case law on equality from that of the CJEU caused by ‘Brexit’, 
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it seems more probable for future developments to occur in that area. Thus, one 
possibility is an eventual softening of the proportionality test to bring it more in line 
with notions of reasonableness. This, reflecting the Court of Appeal thinking in Bolton, 
would help to ensure that dual claims for both unfair dismissal and discrimination did 
not lead to two different results at tribunal, giving greater certainty and clarity for 
employers when managing their workforce. 449  Its impact on equality in those 
workforces might be less positive. 
 
However, higher courts in the future may alternatively prefer to adopt a York 
approach that highlights the distinctiveness of both ERA and EqA, allowing for their 
differing underlying purposes, and explicitly sanctioning the concept that claims under 
each will involve separate legal tests.450 Such a result would make managing dismissal 
more complex for employers, but would be advantageous for claimants and 
disadvantaged groups in general.  
 
5.2 Final remarks 
Overall, it could be said that this dissertation has not been entirely successful in its 
quest to identify precise differences between reasonable responses and 
proportionality when applied to dismissal situations. However, it does instead suggest 
that the relationship between both legal tests is fascinatingly complex, and deserving 
of study. 
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Glossary of abbreviations used 
 
CJEU: Court of Justice of the European Union 
EAT: Employment Appeal Tribunal 
ECJ: European Court of Justice 
EqA: Equality Act 2010 
ERA: Employment Rights Act 1996 
EU: European Union 
PCP: Provision, criterion, or practice 
SOSR: Some other substantial reason 
 
